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We exploit a large, quasi-randomized, 2.5-year-long income tax holiday to identify
intertemporal labor responses of high-wage earners to net wage changes. In Au-
gust 2013, the Argentine government exempted a group of wage earners from the
income tax for 2.5 years while leaving in place the tax on other high-wage earners.
Eligibility was based on whether past wage earnings were below a fixed threshold,
thus levying sharply different marginal and average tax rates—effectively 0% for
workers below the threshold. Using rich population-wide administrative data and
a regression discontinuity design, we estimate a precise and very small wage earn-
ings elasticity of 0.017 for this large, salient, and temporary income tax change.
Responses are larger for more flexible outcomes (overtime hours) and for more
elastic groups (job switchers and managers). We also find avoidance responses
from new entrants who faced no tax if their first monthly wage was below the
fixed threshold. This strategic entry below the threshold to dodge taxes required
coordination with employers. Our findings indicate rigidities in the labor market
that require employer-employee cooperation to be overcome for wage earners to
be able to respond to tax changes.
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1 Introduction
The proper taxation of high earners features prominently in current policy debates.
While more progressive income tax rates may mechanically reduce income disparities,
critics argue that they can backfire by triggering behavioral responses that increase ef-
ficiency costs (Slemrod, 1995). For high-income earners, there is convincing evidence
for tax avoidance responses, but it has proven much more difficult to assess whether
such earners change their real behavior in response to taxation (Saez et al., 2012b). In
part, this is because tax changes tend to be small and difficult to exploit for research
purposes (Chetty et al., 2011). For instance, research designs based on kink points usu-
ally lack power to identify elasticities at the high-income end and the changes resulting
from tax reforms are rarely large enough to trigger real responses (Chetty, 2012). In
fact, most of the studies in the literature are based on small changes to provisions of the
tax code, or comprehensive tax reforms with many moving pieces, that hinder clean
identification of changes in work behavior. Oftentimes, such policy variation does not
provide a good counterfactual or comparable control group. Another limitation is that
measuring the actual work effort of high-income earners is particularly difficult given
the available data (Saez, 2017). For example, most studies use annual tax return data,
which are useful for estimating the elasticity of taxable income and for uncovering
avoidance responses, but are not well-suited to analyze labor supply responses (e.g.,
datasets lack information on hours or days worked). Convincing identification of real
labor responses to taxation thus requires granular data coupled with large, salient,
and exogenous variation in tax rates that differentially affect a comparable subset of
the labor force.1
In this paper, we break new ground on this important topic by leveraging high-
quality data and by exploiting an unprecedented quasi-randomized income tax hol-
iday for high-wage earners, that meets the aforementioned ideal features for identi-
fication. In August 2013, the President of Argentina issued an Executive Order that
exempted a group of high-wage earners from the income tax for 2.5 years while leav-
ing in place the tax on other high-wage earners. Eligibility was based on two simple
rules: (i) workers with wage employment history between January and August 2013
were tax-exempt if their highest monthly wage during those eight months was less than or
equal to a fixed threshold of AR$ 15,000 (about US$ 3,000); (ii) workers without wage
employment history between January and August 2013, who entered the labor force
thereafter, were tax-exempt if their first monthly wage was less than or equal to AR$
15,000. In contrast, those whose wages were above the threshold continued to pay
1The ideal, yet unfeasible, experiment would be to randomize tax rates across workers and then com-
pare working hours between those facing higher tax rates and those facing lower or zero tax rates (e.g.,
see Ashenfelter and Plant (1990) for cash transfers).
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taxes normally.2 So, for the first group, the rule was based on past wage earnings but
it applied to subsequent wage earnings. For the second group, the rule was based on
the wage paid in the first month of employment irrespective of subsequent earnings.
That is, in both cases, workers did not lose the benefit if monthly wages exceeded the
AR$ 15,000 threshold after August 2013. Moreover, the tax exemption applied to their
entire salary (i.e., zero marginal and average tax rates).
This policy emerged as an immediate tax relief and a temporary fix to a deteriorated
progressive income tax schedule whose parameters were not indexed for inflation.
Between 2000 and 2016, Argentina suffered an average annual inflation of 25% that
reduced the significance of nominal taxable thresholds and laid the foundations for
such a sharp change. The consequence of this targeted tax cut, in terms of the share
of wage earners affected by the income tax, is illustrated in Figure 1. In September
2013, about 50% of wage earners subject to the tax suddenly stopped being liable and
remained untaxed for 2.5 years. This amounted to 1.2 million of upper wage earners
whose income fell between the 70th and 85th percentiles. By contrast, those in the
top 15% of the wage earnings distribution experienced a tax increase due to a "bracket
creep" effect.3 A new administration took office in December 2015, and in February
2016 it reversed the tax change and increased the nontaxable income floor to avoid a
discrete jump in the number of taxpayers. Nonetheless, with an inflation rate of almost
40% in 2016, most of the exempt workers again became subject to the tax in less than a
year. All in all, this tax break applied sharply different tax rates to wage earners who
coexist in the same labor market, and even in the same firm.
The differing opportunities for manipulation of the two assignment rules naturally
lead to two research designs. The retrospective nature of rule (i), for incumbents,
precluded manipulation because the current tax treatment was based on past wage
earnings from the reference period of January-August 2013, before the policy was even
announced. Hence, comparing workers below and above AR$ 15,000 using a regres-
sion discontinuity design (RDD) offers a unique opportunity to estimate the causal
effect of a large, salient, and sharp tax cut on the labor supply of high-wage earners
(at the threshold). In contrast, rule (ii), for new entrants to the labor market, afforded
opportunity for manipulation because it was based on the first monthly wage, and the
information was available to workers before entering the labor market. Hence, work-
ers had an incentive to collude with employers to receive an initial month’s wage
below AR$ 15,000 and avoid the income tax entirely. Such collusion was also advan-
2The AR$ 15,000 threshold is located at the 85th percentile of the monthly wage distribution. Indepen-
dent workers are taxed under a different regime and did not benefit from the policy. They could serve
as a control group, but their income is reported in another database unavailable to us.
3The idea of bracket creep is that a taxpayer near the top end of a bracket is likely to "creep" to the
next bracket due to inflation and wage indexation, even if her income does not change in real terms.
In ongoing work, we are using the bracket creep design from Saez (2003) to estimate labor supply
elasticities.
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tageous to employers, who could recruit more cheaply. Accordingly, we implement a
density analysis of the starting monthly wage around this notch. We also leverage the
context of high inflation to predict a counterfactual mass of new entrants above the
notch, which we compare to the observed mass to infer avoidance responses.
The tax break was announced on August 28th, 2013, applied to monthly wages
earned after September 1st, 2013, and was repealed on February 22nd, 2016. Although
the policy was perceived as temporary, both the beginning and the end were unantic-
ipated and thus created income effects for the group that was employed. Hence, our
RDD strategy allows us to identify uncompensated intertemporal elasticities for the
intensive margin. For both strategies, we use rich employer-employee social security
data for the universe of private and public wage earners. These records are reported
by employers on a monthly basis and contain not only monthly wage earnings but
also some of its components such as base pay, bonuses, overtime pay (and hours), and
other supplemental pay—all outcomes that are rarely available in other countries and
that are well-suited for studying labor responses to taxation.
Our first-stage analysis documents sizable changes in tax rates for upper wage earn-
ers above and below the tax holiday threshold, changes that are much larger than
most prior studies have reported (see Table 1 in Chetty (2012)). Five days after the an-
nouncement, the marginal tax rate for workers with wage earnings slightly below the
discontinuity went from about 25% to 0%, and their average tax rate decreased from
about 7% to 0%. Both marginal and average tax rates converged quickly to their pre-
reform levels after the decree was repealed, and remained stable thereafter. In the case
of new entrants, the marginal tax rate was as high as 31-35% for those who entered
slightly above the notch, while their average tax rate was about 10% (and 0% if they
entered below the notch).
We report four major findings: First, the RDD analysis yields a precisely estimated,
very small response of wage earners to the large, salient, and temporary income tax
change. The evolution of the RD estimates shows a small increase in wage earnings in
2014 and 2015 that faded away in 2016 and 2017 when the tax holiday was repealed.
In 2015, tax-exempt workers with incomes below the discontinuity exhibit an excess
wage earnings growth of 0.4% relative to non-exempt workers, which translates into
an elasticity of 0.017. Second, this small aggregate effect is primarily driven by rela-
tively flexible components of workers’ pay. In particular, among these components,
we find an intensive margin elasticity of overtime hours to taxation of 0.184.4 Third,
we also find larger effects when we analyze small subgroups likely to be more elastic
in their responses. For example, tax-exempt workers switching jobs seem to negoti-
4This is computed over an average base of 25 overtime hours per month. Although larger than the
wage earnings elasticity of 0.017, it is still small if we include (unobserved) straight-time hours in the
computation of the percentage change.
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ate their new contracts more favorably. The implied wage earnings elasticity for jobs
switchers is 0.096 in 2015. Managers and executives are another group that exhibit a
relatively large response. We find a large increase in the wage earnings of those lo-
cated in the tax-benefit zone relative to those who kept paying taxes normally. The
wage earnings elasticity for managers in 2015 is 0.311. Fourth, we find that the re-
form induced some high-earning new entrants to enter strategically below the AR$
15,000 threshold to avoid the income tax. Again, this behavior is more pronounced for
managers and executives.
We complement these findings with evidence that is inconsistent with four alterna-
tive explanations of the aggregate near-zero result. First, we argue that this result is
not driven by lack of saliency, because the tax shock was highly publicized and dis-
cussed. The announcement was made by the President with live nationwide coverage
on the main news channels. It also appeared on the front page of the main newspa-
pers. The IRS issued a memo explaining who was eligible for the benefit and how to
compute the assignment variables, and this was amply discussed on TV newscasts.5
In addition, the Executive Order mandated the inclusion of two items in the pay stubs
of tax-exempt workers: the amount that should be withheld and the same amount
credited back. Second, we argue that the null result is not explained by lack of enforce-
ment. Employers and their accountants, who calculate and file monthly withholdings
on behalf of workers, were in charge of computing the running variable and could
face severe penalties from the Argentine IRS for placing workers on the wrong side of
the discontinuity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that accountants followed the eligibil-
ity rules closely to avoid such penalties.6 Third, we show evidence that rules out an
incidence story where employees work longer hours but employers lower their wage
rate. We use a sample of overtime workers, for whom we observe monthly hours, to
compute wage rates and we find a very precise zero effect in the RDD. Fourth, we also
argue that the near-null result is not a combination of substitution effects and income ef-
fects that cancel each other out. Under the assumption that the income effect decreases
with age (Cesarini et al., 2017), the uncompensated response should be higher for older
workers. Yet our empirical analysis broken down by age group does not support this
prediction.
Overall, this paper provides some of the clearest evidence to date that, in the ag-
gregate, high-wage earners do not adjust their labor supply in response to temporary
tax changes. This result strikes us as remarkable given the size, salience, and duration
of the tax break. The larger effect for job switchers might imply that wage earners are
5Unlike typical tax reforms, these features were simple to understand from the point of view of the
worker. They did not require any understanding of the tax code whatsoever, only that if a worker was
lucky to be below the threshold, she no longer had to worry about the income tax.
6In the appendix, we present evidence from two anonymous firms (one medium-sized and one large)
that shared detailed payroll data with us, and we find 100% compliance around the discontinuity.
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demand constrained. That is, workers are basically stuck in a job in which the contract
states how much they work and how much they earn, limiting their ability to choose
how many hours to work over the course of the year. Likewise, overtime allows for
some discretion in the number of hours worked and yet here, too, we find relatively
small effects. This could mean that labor demand restrictions are at play such that
workers are not free to vary their overtime hours (e.g., many facilities require some
fixed level of overtime to run operations continuously). The larger response of man-
agers and executives could be explained by their proximity to firm owners and by a
broader compensation mix that lets them adjust reported wages and hours more easily
than can the typical employee. Finally, the strategic behavior by new entrants to dodge
taxes would not be possible without coordination with employers. Taken together, our
results point toward rigidities in the labor market which require employer-employee
cooperation for wage earners to respond to tax changes.
This paper complements the empirical literature that estimates labor supply re-
sponses to income taxation. The most reliable evidence up to the late 2000s is sum-
marized in two contemporaneous surveys that reach opposite conclusions: while Saez
et al. (2012b) argue that the profession settled on a fairly small compensated elasticity
of labor supply with respect to taxes, Keane (2011) casts doubt on the existence of such
a broad consensus.7 The controversies in this literature usually revolve around iden-
tification issues and data limitations that our setting circumvents. We contribute to
this debate by documenting that, in contrast to numerous other tax reforms that have
been studied, a large and salient tax change had no detectable near-term impact on the
labor supply of high-wage earners.
Our paper also contributes to the very limited quasi-experimental evidence on in-
tertemporal real labor responses to taxation. In two contemporaneous papers simi-
lar to ours, Martinez et al. (2018) and Sigurdsson (2018) estimate the Frisch elasticity
by exploiting tax-free years in Switzerland and Iceland, respectively, that arose from
the transition to pay-as-you-earn tax systems.8 Unlike these labor market-wide tax
holidays, an advantage of our setting is that the tax cut only affected a subgroup of
high-wage earners and, therefore, general equilibrium effects are less of a concern. In
addition, our local RDD has higher internal validity and provides a clean comparison
group at the threshold that lets us average out recurring identification threats such as
mean reversion and measurement error.
This article is also related to recent work on real labor responses to taxation. Tazhit-
7Keane (2011) meta-analysis reports an average compensated elasticity of 0.31, which he considers suf-
ficient to induce large efficiency losses from progressive income taxation. Saez et al. (2012b) focus on
a narrower base, taxable income, which captures both real and avoidance behavior. Elasticities range
from no effect to sizable responses. See also Blundell and Macurdy (1999) for an older major survey.
8The study by Sigurdsson (2018) uses the same variation as Bianchi et al. (2001) but with better data and
an improved empirical strategy.
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dinova (2019b) and Tazhitdinova (2019a) analyze part-time and secondary jobs in Ger-
many and find large responses at the lower end of the wage distribution. These two
margins of response are less common at the upper end that is the focus of our study.
Kleven and Schultz (2014) provide compelling evidence of small labor-income elas-
ticities for wage earners by exploiting large variation in Denmark. We also add to a
modest literature that uses survey data to study overtime hours (e.g., Cahuc and Car-
cillo (2014) in France). This important margin of response to income taxation is largely
unexplored due to lack of data and sharp identifying variation that we manage to
leverage. Finally, our findings relate to recent work that argues that firm preferences
matter for labor supply and reported income responses to taxation (Best, 2014; Kreiner
et al., 2016; Tazhitdinova, 2019a).
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Argentine income tax
and the variation we use. Section 3 discusses the expected responses to the tax change.
Section 4 introduces the administrative data and summary statistics. Section 5 presents
the empirical strategy. Section 6 shows the first stage change in tax rates and evidence
on salience. The main results are presented in Section 7. Section 8 shows the avoidance
behavior of new entrants. Section 9 presents our conclusions.
2 The setting and a local income tax holiday
Argentina is one of the countries with the highest tax-to-GDP ratio in the world, in
line with the average of OECD countries. It is a federal country that levies taxes at
the federal, provincial, and municipal levels. Taken together, the total revenue-to-
GDP ratio from these three levels of government increased from 20% in 2001 to 34% in
2015.9 National taxes contributed to this dynamic by increasing from 13.4% to 17.6%
of GDP during this period. In particular, the income tax has played a central role by
increasing its participation in national tax revenue from 27.4% to 37.1%. It is the most
progressive tax and the second-most-important source of tax revenue after the VAT.
We next explain how the personal income tax works in Argentina and we describe in
detail the tax change exploited in this paper.
2.1 The personal income tax in Argentina
Argentina has an individually-based personal income tax (PIT) with seven brackets
and progressive marginal tax rates ranging from 9% to 35%. The schedule for work-
9This is mainly explained, in order, by social security contributions, income tax, gross receipts tax, VAT,
export duties, and financial transactions tax.
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ers with positive taxable income is depicted in Table 1.10 Contrary to more developed
economies, the system is characterized by a large exemption floor with two compo-
nents: a fixed universal amount and another portion that varies with the number of
dependents (spouse, children, and other relatives). In 2016, the personal exemptions
for married wage earners with two children were 50% higher than the average wage
of the economy (10% higher for single workers with no children). Consequently, only
relatively high-income workers are reached by this tax (the top 20-30% according to
Figure 1), which is a common feature in many developing countries (Jensen, 2019).11
Employers use a PAYE (Pay-as-You-Earn) system to withhold income taxes from
monthly wages (similar to the U.K. system). Withheld amounts are treated as advance
payments of annual income tax. Each employee receives a withholding summary from
their employer at the end of the year (form F.649) and, if the amount withheld exceeds
an annual tax assessment, the worker is entitled to a refund in January’s paycheck.
The employer is responsible for remitting the income tax to the IRS each month (form
F.744), along with social security contributions (form F.931). At the beginning of the
year or upon hire, employees must inform their employers about exemptions, deduc-
tions, and other jobs through online form F.572 (equivalent to form W-4 in the U.S.).12
In practice, Argentina uses the Cumulative Wage Withholding Method. Every month,
employers have to compute the cumulated taxable income up to the corresponding
month (cumulated wage earnings net of cumulated deductions and allowances), then
use Table 2 (a monthly version of the tax schedule) to calculate the cumulated tax li-
ability up to that month and, finally, subtract withholdings from previous months,
resulting in the amount to be withheld. Contrary to the U.S. Percentage Method, un-
der the Argentine system the tax burden varies according to the seasonal nature of a
job (i.e., higher withholding during months with supplemental pay). This makes it
possible to respond instantly to changes in the income tax. For example, an individual
working overtime in one month could decide to work fewer hours in the next month
because the income tax erodes part of the overtime premium.
Importantly, in Argentina, the law does not require wage earners to file a tax return
at the end of the fiscal year, unless they exceed an annual income threshold deter-
10This schedule applies to wage earners and retirees. The self-employed are taxed under a simplified
regime called Monotributo. Since 2017, the PIT has had 9 brackets and MTRs ranging from 5% to 35%.
11In August 2013, single workers with no children and gross annual earnings below AR$ 108,676 (USD
19,406) were not subject to the income tax. The average gross annual wage for private workers was
AR$ 107,783 (USD 19,247), and the monthly minimum wage was set at AR$ 3,300 (about USD 7,661
annually), well below the first kink.
12Exemptions include spousal and dependent allowances, a minimum non-taxable income, and a large
special deduction for wage earners. Deductions include SSC and other minor deductions such as
prepaid medical care fees, life insurance, medical expenses, mortgage interest, charitable donations,
funeral expenses, and domestic services. Contrary to the practice in developed countries, in Argentina
itemized deductions are typically capped and represent on average only 2-3% of gross earnings (Tor-
tarolo, 2018). In the case of multiple employers, the employer that pays the highest monthly wage
acts as the withholding agent for the worker’s total earnings.
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mined by law (e.g. USD 30,000 in 2016). If a person crosses this threshold, or earns
honoraria, dividends from a company, capital gains, rental income, or has some other
complicating tax factor, then she is required to file the annual tax return F.711, similar
to form 1040 in the U.S. Hence, it is really the employer and firm accountants that play
a key role in computing and enforcing the tax, while employees only have to examine
their pay stub every month to see how much tax they pay.
2.2 Macro context and the income tax holiday
Inflation and bracket creep. The policy studied in this paper emerged as an immedi-
ate tax relief and a temporary fix to a deteriorated progressive income tax schedule in
a context where inflation was high and the schedule was not indexed. In particular,
the following four facts explain the evolution of the PIT during the period 2000-2016
and the government’s motivation to provide a tax break for high-income earners: (1)
starting in 2007, Argentina experienced an average annual inflation rate of 25% with
peaks of up to 40% (black line in Figure A2a); (2) nominal wages were adjusted semi-
annually to preserve the purchasing power of workers (red line in Figure A2a); (3) the
tax schedule remained fixed in nominal terms from 2000 to 2016; (4) the exemption
floor was partially adjusted in some years and usually lagged the average increase of
wage earnings (Figure A3c).
Taken together, these stylized facts had two direct implications: First, that more
workers started to pay the income tax because inflation reduced the real value of
personal exemptions—a parameter that determines the floor of the first bracket (Fig-
ure A3c). Second, an increasing proportion of individuals’ taxable income became
subject to the top marginal tax rate because inflation reduced the significance of the
tax bracket thresholds (Figures A3a and A3b). This phenomenon is known in the lit-
erature as “bracket creep” (Saez, 2003). Hence, the PIT lost its progressivity because
workers with very different earnings were taxed at the same top marginal tax rate.
At the same time, however, the system gained some progressivity by reaching more
workers in the upper tail of the earnings distribution and by increasing the tax burden
on those who already were subject to the tax (Figures A3b and A3d).
An income tax holiday on high earners. To alleviate the increasing tax burden on
high-wage earners, in August 2013 the President of Argentina implemented a targeted
income tax cut that lasted 2.5 years and differentially affected otherwise comparable
workers.13 Eligibility for the tax cut was based on two simple rules:
13The official reason given for the tax break was that “it is a permanent policy of the executive branch to
implement countercyclical measures that strengthen the purchasing power of workers and their families and,
with it, the consolidation of the demand and the domestic market” and that “the implementation of these
measures responds to strict justice and equity” (Decree 1242/2013). However, the opposition claimed that
it was a political strategy of the government who, having lost the midterm legislative elections on
9
• Rule (i) - Incumbents: workers with wage employment history between January
and August 2013 were tax-exempt if the highest gross monthly wage they accrued
between January and August 2013 was less than or equal to a fixed threshold of
AR$ 15,000 (percentiles 70th through 85th; AR$ 15,000 ≈ US$ 3,000 in 2013);
• Rule (ii) - New entrants: workers entering the labor force without wage em-
ployment history from January to August 2013 were tax-exempt if their first gross
monthly wage was less than or equal to AR$ 15,000.
In contrast, wage earners with incomes above the threshold continued to pay taxes
normally.14 Self-employed workers also did not benefit from the policy because they
are taxed under a different regime that remained unchanged. This latter group could
serve as a control group, but their income is reported in another database unavailable
to us.15
The tax holiday applied to monthly wages earned after September 1st, 2013, regard-
less of whether one’s monthly wage exceeded AR$ 15,000 after that date. Moreover,
the exemption applied to one’s entire wage (i.e., marginal and average tax rates both
were set to zero). The key difference between the two eligibility rules is that the first
was based on past wage earnings while the second rule was based on the wage paid in
the first—and only the first—month of employment. As explained below, the first rule





























Reference Period: Jan-Aug’13 Earnings fully untaxed if eligible (2.5 years)
The timeline of the tax holiday and other relevant events are summarized above.
The policy was announced by the President, with live TV coverage, on the evening
of August 27, 2013. On August 28, 2013, the government published Executive Order
August 11th, 2013, used the tax cut to improve its public image in the run up to the general elections
held on October 27th, 2013. Moreover, a hike in the exemption floor was a key request of labor unions
representing upper wage earners (e.g., Hugo Moyano, leader of the General Confederation of Labor
and the Truckers’ Union).
14In practice, wage earners whose highest gross monthly wage between January and August 2013 was
between AR$ 15,001 and AR$ 25,000 partially benefited from a 20% increase in personal exemptions
(30% for workers living in the Patagonia region). But this benefit was quickly eroded by inflation and
can be ignored in the analysis.
15In Argentina, 76% of workers are wage earners, 20% are self-employed, and 4% are entrepreneurs.
About 30% of wage earners were informal during the period of analysis. Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS
and The World Bank).
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1242/2013 which formalized the tax change and groups affected. On August 29, 2013,
the Argentine IRS issued a 2-page memo (RG 3525/2013) explaining in detail the way
to implement the tax cut in practice (e.g., how to compute the threshold, what types
of income should be included, etc.). The tax cut entered into force on September 1,
2013 and was repealed in February 2016 through Executive Order 394/2016 by a new
administration that took office in December 2015.
In terms of public expectations, the policy was perceived as a temporary relief and
it was expected to remain in place at least until the end of 2015. In addition, both the
beginning and the end of the tax break were unanticipated and thus created income ef-
fects for those who were employed. Although the public generally do not expect such
dramatic policies to become permanent, workers and corporate accountants initially
had some uncertainty about whether the tax holiday was going to continue in 2014
because the Executive Order did not include an expiration date. What is certain is that
workers knew the tax holiday was not going to be reversed in 2015 for two reasons.
First, Argentina had presidential elections in 2015 and the government was unlikely
to undo the policy before then. Second, the IRS issued another memo in May 2015
(RG 3770/2015) that reconfirmed the tax cut for workers whose earnings in 2013 were
below the eligibility threshold.
During the official announcement of the tax cut, the head of the Argentine IRS re-
ported that 1,497,368 workers and retirees would no longer be subject to the income
tax and that the implied fiscal cost would be AR$4,495 million for the rest of 2013.
To partially fund this loss, the president announced that two new bills were going to
be sent to the Congress which would raise AR$2,000 million from the private sector.
The first was a 15% tax on capital gains from shares and securities not listed on the
stock market. The second was a 10% tax on the dividends paid to shareholders.16 In
practice, the reform reduced the share of wage earners affected by the tax by approx-
imately 50%, benefiting workers with incomes between the 70th and 85th percentiles
of the wage distribution (see Figure 1). The marginal tax rate of workers earning about
AR$ 15,000 per month (US$ 3,000) went from 23-27% to 0%.
Enforcement. In terms of enforcement, the income tax law states that if the em-
ployer does not properly withhold the income tax from workers’ wages, they are sub-
ject to a 100% fine on the amount of tax owed. Moreover, if they hide information and
cheat, they could be fined 2-10 times the evaded tax liability (Law 11683 article 45). We
therefore believe that employers (and accountants) had incentives to comply with the
law and to determine precisely whether employees’ wages were above or below the
thresholds. At the least, they had nothing whatsoever to gain by colluding with and
helping their employees.
16This official information can be checked in two articles from Pagina|12 (https://goo.gl/iZUFtF) and
La Nación (https://goo.gl/x8bCzv).
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In sum, the income tax holiday created a situation whereby relatively similar work-
ers ended up facing sharply different tax rates, depending on whether their wage
earnings from January to August 2013 were higher or lower than AR$15,000. This
is, in fact, the running variable that we use later in the RDD analysis. Note also that,
with an annual inflation of 38% in 2014 and 27% in 2015, workers with incomes above
AR$15,000 per month ended up experiencing a tax hike due to the “bracket creep” ef-
fect. Therefore, the comparison of workers below and above this fixed cutoff provides
a unique opportunity to estimate the impact of a large, salient, and temporary tax cut
on the labor supply of high earners.
2.3 Argentine labor market and wage setting
Argentina has a highly regulated labor market with strong labor unions and a fairly
centralized wage-setting mechanism. Collective wage agreements are signed every
year between the major labor unions, employers’ associations, and the government at
the industry-wide level (tripartite negotiations).17 Each agreement regulates the con-
tractual base pay (monthly or hourly) as a function of seniority, qualifications, degree
of responsibility, etc., and sets other specific clauses such as non-contributory one-time
payments if inflation is higher than expected, overtime premiums, meal allowances,
vacations, etc.18 Due to high and persistent inflation, the contracts are typically nego-
tiated every year (known as paritarias). These industry-wide agreements are de-facto
binding for all employers and all workers, irrespective of union membership. In some
cases, firm-level agreements might be signed to distribute bonuses (e.g., related to in-
dicators of profitability or productivity).
In terms of the work schedule, the majority of wage earners are employed under a
standard fixed contract (indeterminate full-time or part-time) and, in some sectors, it is
common practice to work overtime. A normal working day has a maximum of 8 hours
and 48 hours a week. In the case of night work between 9pm and 6am, the working
day cannot exceed 7 hours and 42 hours a week. In the case of jobs considered haz-
ardous or risky, the workday cannot last more than 6 hours and 36 hours a week. Any
working time beyond these statutory limits is considered supplementary and must be
paid as overtime. Employers must pay a 50% overtime premium during weekdays
and 100% premium on Saturdays after 1pm, Sundays, and national holidays. The leg-
islation also establishes a limit of 30 overtime hours per month and 200 overtime hours
per year. Nonetheless, employers can request a specific authorization from the Min-
17Agreements become operative upon approval from the Ministry of Labor (a process called “homolo-
gacion”). Once approved, the agreement is legally binding on all employers and workers included in
the sector, within its territorial scope.
18Contrary to the practice in the U.S., in Argentina most employees are paid by the month and not by
the hour.
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istry of Labor to increase that quota. Likewise, collective bargaining agreements might
set a cap better suited to a given sector’s specific needs (e.g., oil workers are exempt
from the time limits established in the law). In practice, to compute the base hourly
wage, employers usually divide the monthly salary by the number of hours worked
per month (e.g., 8 hours × 25 days = 200 monthly hours).19
The rigid bargaining structure and working schedule described in this subsection
already suggests that it might be hard for wage earners to freely adjust their labor
supply in response to net wage changes.20
3 Predictions from the theory
Individuals can respond to income taxation through many channels such as working
hours, work effort, career choices, form and timing of compensation, tax avoidance,
tax evasion, etc. Our research design and rich data offer a rare opportunity to test for
real responses and, for some groups, avoidance behavior. We explain the predicted re-
sponses separately for incumbents, i.e. workers who had a wage employment history
in the reference period of January-August 2013, and for new entrants, who entered the
labor market after the reference period.
Incumbent wage earners. The dynamic labor supply model from MaCurdy (1981)
provides the bedrock for understanding labor supply responses to temporary changes
in the net-of-tax wage rate (e.g., a temporary tax cut in period 1 reversed in period
2). Under this model, workers might find it rational to work more in period 1, save
part of the earnings, and work less in period 2. When tax changes are anticipated,
income effects are muted, and thus the strength of this reaction is measured by the
Frisch elasticity of substitution. In our setting, however, the tax cut came as a sur-
prise, thus creating income effects. Hence, in principle, our estimates capture a mix
of substitution and income effects. The former motivates wage earners to work more
and the latter incentivizes them to work less. When substitution effects dominate, as
suggested by previous work, we should expect more hours and higher wage earnings
for tax-exempt workers during 2014 and 2015 followed by decreases in 2016 when the
tax cut is revoked.
It is worth noting that, in practice, wage earners typically do not have a lot of flex-
ibility to adjust their work schedule (e.g., due to demand-side constraints on hours).
19All these regulations are contemplated in the Labor Contract Law Art. 201 and Decree 484/2000.
20In the appendix, we provide two examples of pay scales from two labor unions. Figure A4 shows the
pay scale for wage earners in the banking sector in 2015. The pay scale is pretty much predetermined
as it is based on hierarchy and seniority, which limits the space for real labor supply adjustments.
Figure A5 shows the pay scale for city bus drivers in 2013. Although the scale is also predetermined,
in this case there is more space for adjustments because, for example, workers can choose overtime
hours.
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Hence, behavioral responses are likely restricted to certain discrete choices (e.g., full-
time or part-time jobs, job switching, secondary jobs) or to flexible portions of income
(overtime, commissions, bonuses). Likewise, some groups may have relatively greater
flexibility, such as managers and executives, private sector workers versus public ser-
vants, workers close to retirement, non-unionized workers, single women, and work-
ers in specific sectors such as manufacturing, transportation, or professional services.
Our design and data allow us to analyze these margins and subgroups.
Among the more flexible source of income, overtime work deserves special atten-
tion. This is an important yet relatively unexplored margin of response to taxation that
is less constrained than regular hours. In a world with taxes, the additional income ef-
fectively received from working longer hours is lower than workers might expect. This
is because every extra hour worked is taxed at the worker’s highest marginal tax rate.
Moreover, working overtime could bump workers into higher tax brackets. Therefore,
in countries where overtime work is common, this type of work is indeed the key mar-
gin of interest to understand the efficiency effects of income taxes. In our setting, and
during the tax holiday, tax-exempt workers could find it more worthwhile to work
overtime hours because they could keep full amount earned from such work. More-
over, the substitution effect is more likely to dominate in this case because overtime
pay represents only a small portion of total compensation, thus minimizing income
effects. In contrast, during the period of analysis, non-exempt employees had less in-
centive to work overtime because of the “bracket creep” effect. Our data allow us to
study monthly overtime hours to test these predictions.
Finally, our setting also allows us to study the extensive margin decision of drop-
ping out from the labor market. Intuitively, tax-exempt workers on the margin of
exiting (e.g., close to retirement) could find it optimal to remain employed to take ad-
vantage of the tax break. In contrast, the unequal horizontal treatment of workers
around the discontinuity could induce disgruntled non-exempt workers to quit their
formal sector jobs in favor of informal employment to escape from the tax or perhaps
to become self-employed. Hence, we could expect a lower dropout rate of incumbent
workers with incomes below 15k during the tax holiday.
New entrants. For this group of workers, the tax change induced entry effects and
avoidance behavior. Recall that the eligibility rule was based on the first monthly
wage, and the information was available to workers in advance of entering the labor
market. Hence, there was opportunity for manipulation. On the intensive margin,
the new entrants had an incentive to collude with employers to enter strategically at a
salary below AR$ 15,000 and, thus escape from the income tax. On the extensive mar-
gin, workers with potential monthly wage earnings of around AR$ 15,000 who were
considering entering the labor force had an incentive to do so (below the threshold)
during the tax holiday to take advantage of this zero-tax period. However, we will
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show that this income threshold was higher than typical entry-level salaries and thus
it is unlikely to have triggered employment effects.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
In the analysis we combine three administrative databases: (1) Wage earnings data:
monthly earnings reported to the Social Security Administration (known as SIPA); (2)
Registry of employees (known as Simplificacion Registral); (3) Family relationships: a
database that links family members in the same household (known as ADP).
Wage earnings data (SIPA). The core data source used in the analysis is the SIPA
database. It contains social security records for the universe of registered wage earn-
ers in Argentina from January 1995 to December 2018. These administrative data are
reported by employers on a monthly basis through form F.931 (the equivalent of Form
941 in the U.S.). All firms must use the same online processing software, SICOSS, with
a simple interface that makes it a reliable data source (see Figure A6 in the appendix).
We use a particular version of the SIPA database, which tracks individuals’ full work-
ing history, in every firm, month by month. This employer-employee panel allows
us to generate variables related to jobs held before and after the tax holiday and to
identify job switches. We focus on the period 2011-2017.21
In 2013, the year of the reform, the data included about 450,000 private employers
and about 7 million private wage earners (10 million when we include public em-
ployees). The data have two types of (scrambled) identifiers: CUIL, which identifies
workers, and CUIT, which identifies the firm(s) where people work. Other variables
contained in the data are: gross monthly wage earnings, date of birth, gender, length
of employment, indicator for private sector, 4-digit ISIC sector code of the firm, labor
union status, and type of contract (permanent, temporary, full-time, part-time, man-
ager). Importantly, we do not observe take-home pay. We observe posted earnings
before employee social security contributions and income taxes in each month of the
data, which is the variable that firms used to determine whether a worker qualified
for the tax break or not.
The Ministry of Labor also provided access to some of the raw files that are used to
create the SIPA database. In particular, we have access to the raw data files for every
April, August, and October in the period 2011-2016. These monthly files contain very
rich information that is rarely available in standard employer-employee databases.
For instance, we can decompose monthly wage earnings into 5 categories: base pay,
overtime pay, 13th salary (50% in June and 50% in December), salary supplements
21This version of SIPA is processed by Observatorio de Empleo y Dinámica Empresarial (OEDE-MTEySS).
All the records were de-identified so that workers and firms remain anonymous. The administrative
databases were accessed at the Argentine Ministry of Labor (MTEySS).
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for seniority or for earning a college degree, bonuses (productivity, commissions, pre-
senteeism), vacation pay, and non-contributory payments negotiated by labor unions
(e.g., lump sum bonuses to compensate for inflation). In the case of overtime pay,
employers also have to report the corresponding number of overtime hours worked
in that month, which enables us to calculate the hourly wage. Employers also re-
port the number of days worked per month. Although this variable does not exhibit
much variability in the aggregate, it does vary for special work arrangements such as
night shifts or hazardous jobs in which employees are required to work every other
week/day and have to rest on the off days.
Registry of employees (Simplificacion Registral). Every time that employers reg-
ister or unregister an employee they must do it online via the IRS website through
the centralized system Simplificacion Registral. During this process, they also have to
report a firm-branch identifier, the address of the worker and of the firm-branch, the
initial occupation of the employee using 4-digit ISCO codes, a code for the labor union
that represents the worker, and, in some cases, the worker’s educational level. These
are important variables that are rarely available in typical administrative datasets and
they allow us to elucidate the mechanisms of workers’ responses through a set of ex-
ercises that we explain below.
Family links (ADP). We also combine the social security data with another database
that contains family relationships. These data allow us to accurately link workers to
their dependents (spouse and children) since the 1970s. In Argentina, to claim social
benefits or deduct dependents from one’s income tax, applicants have to register and
report their family composition. Using workers’ identifiers, we were able to merge
these data with SIPA and determine each worker’s marital status and number of de-
pendents. The workers that appear in SIPA but not in ADP are considered single with
no children.
It is important to clarify that the earnings data used in this paper do not contain
income tax variables and, thus, we do not observe withheld income taxes. Note, how-
ever, that social security data include both those workers who pay the income tax and
those who have no income tax liability. This feature is crucial for our analysis, which
entails tracking workers who were fully exempt after the reform; this is the reason
why SIPA data are better suited for the empirical analysis than is any other source of
data. Where tax information was missing, we used the tax calculator developed by
Tortarolo (2018), which allows us to identify workers subject to the income tax, and
compute marginal tax rates and monthly tax withholdings.22
Table 3 reports some summary statistics for all private and public wage earners,
and for three groups of workers defined based on earnings between January and Au-
22The calculator uses income from SIPA, family links from ADP, and the parameters of the income tax.
It is analogous to the NBER’s Tax Simulator in the U.S. For more details, see Tortarolo (2018).
16
gust 2013: (1) workers who earned between 10k and 15k per month;23 (2) workers
who earned between 15k and 25k per month; and (3) workers who earned between
14k and 16k per month. About 14% of employees moved from the income tax paying
zone to the non-paying zone in September 2013 (column 2), and about 9% of the to-
tal population of wage earners qualified for a partial tax cut due to the 20% increase
in personal exemptions immediately following the reform (column 3).24 These two
groups of workers are in the 7th-9th deciles of the earnings distribution. Hence, the
reform studied here mainly affected those workers earning relatively higher incomes.
If we focus our attention on the group of workers located around 15k in the earnings
distribution (column 4), which is the main discontinuity introduced by the reform, we
can see that it comprises mainly prime-age workers, 43% of them work in the public
sector, half of them are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, 38% are female
workers, and around 7% have multiple jobs.
5 Empirical Strategy
To study the response of individuals to the income tax, one could run a regression
of the change in reported income on the change in the net-of-tax rate. However, the
regression coefficient would be biased because marginal tax rates are a function of
taxable income. Hence, the literature has typically relied on exogenous variation pro-
vided by tax reforms and a variety of estimation techniques to identify the elasticity
of taxable income to taxation (see Saez et al. (2012b) for a recent survey). In this paper,
we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD), which overcomes identification dif-
ficulties that affected previous work (e.g., mean reversion and heterogenous income
trends) and which is known to have a higher internal validity than other methods. We
also complement the analysis with a difference-in-differences approach to study the
response of workers farther from the discontinuity or when we are underpowered to
run the RDD in small subgroups.
Recall that the policy created a sharp discontinuity in tax rates depending on whether
the assignment variable—the highest gross monthly wage accrued between January and Au-
gust of 2013—was below or above AR$ 15,000. This feature naturally leads to a regres-
sion discontinuity design. The basic idea is to compare wage earners with incomes
just above and just below the threshold to infer the causal effect of the tax change.
This design is appealing because it is relatively simple and transparent. Therefore, we
23In August 2013, the gross monthly minimum non-taxable income was AR$ 8,360 for a single worker
without children and AR$ 11,563 for a married worker with two children.
24Note that the percentage of exempt workers in column 2 basically coincides with the official numbers
reported in Figure 1.
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will identify tax effects by running regressions of the form:








γ1k · 1(Ri ≤ c)(Ri − c)k + ei (1)
where Yi denotes any outcome of interest for worker i in any month or year before,
during, and after the tax holiday, c = 15k is the cutoff of interest, and Ri is the running
variable defined as
Ri ≡ max{gross monthly wagei | January to August 2013} (2)
The coefficient of interest capturing the effect of the discontinuity at c is β. A simple
way to illustrate the RDD is to plot average outcome Yi by disjoint bins of the running
variable Ri and to draw a polynomial fit below and above the cutoffs. We follow this
procedure before, during, and after the tax holiday is implemented. Intuitively, the
treatment may be as good as randomly assigned for individuals in the neighborhood
of Ri = c, so comparing treated and non-treated workers reveals a treatment effect (i.e.
the effect of the tax cut/hike on labor supply).
The labor outcomes considered in the analysis below include: annual and monthly
wage earnings, overtime pay, overtime hours, base pay, percentiles of wage earnings,
fraction of workers with multiple jobs, fraction of workers dropping out, and per-
centage change in gross wages relative to the baseline income. In the first stage, we
show that the marginal tax rate (MTR) and the average tax rate (ATR) change sharply
around the 15k cutoff. In the second stage, we analyze whether workers adjust their
labor supply in response to these changes.
To complement this strategy, we also implement a standard difference-in-differences
(DD) analysis with the goal of studying the response of workers farther from the dis-
continuity. In this case, we run regressions of the following form:
Yit = αi + γt + ∑
t 6=Aug′13
βkt (It × Tki ) + uit (3)
T1i =
1, if Ri ∈ (10k, 15k]0, if Ri ∈ (15k, 25k]
where It is an indicator for time and Tki is an indicator for whether i is affected by the
reform. We normalize βAug′13 = 0 so that these estimates can be interpreted as the
change in Yit relative to August 2013 when the tax holiday was implemented. The
identification assumption is that the outcomes for workers in different buckets would
have trended similarly in the absence of the tax change. We present the results graph-
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ically because it is more transparent and is an easy way to test for parallel pre-trends.
5.1 Identification checks
A fundamental identifying assumption for the RDD is that Ri must be as good as ran-
domly assigned in the neighborhood of Ri = c. This may be violated if individuals
can exactly control the value of Ri and, therefore, the location relative to the thresh-
old. If individuals are strategically locating above or below the threshold to benefit
from the tax cut, we would expect bunching on whichever side of the discontinuity is
preferable (in this case, the left side, to escape the tax entirely).
Figure 2 plots the distribution of the running variable to visually test for this threat.
Reassuringly, wage earners did not sort in the neighborhood of the thresholds as there
is no bunching in the number of wage earners just below 15k. Another important
observation is that wage earners do not seem to bunch at the first kink point of the
income tax where tax liability starts, denoted by the first red vertical line in the figure.
The absence of bunching at the first kink already suggests that the overall response of
wage earners to the income tax ought to be small.25 In the figure, one can also see that
relatively high-income workers are subject to the income tax (those to the right of the
first kink). The mass of workers between the first kink and 15k are the ones who paid
no income tax for 2.5 years, and the mass of workers above 15k ended up paying more
taxes after 2.5 years due to inflation and bracket creep.
Although not visible, the data present spikes at some round numbers that serve as
focal points (e.g., base pay pre-determined in the pay scales of labor unions). This
is a standard feature of administrative wage earnings data (see, for example, Dube
et al. (2018)).26 We argue that this is a fluke of the data and does not pose a threat
to our empirical strategy for the following reasons: First, the data we use to construct
the running variable were reported before the reform was put in place, so it is virtually
impossible to manipulate a firm’s payroll tax return to game the system. Second, firms
face no economic incentives to cheat as the statutory burden of the income tax falls
completely on the worker.27 Third, the firm is subject to severe penalties by the IRS
if it is audited and discovered misreporting. Fourth, there is no visible missing mass
to the right of the spike and, therefore, workers located at the spike could be coming
from the left or from the right.
A formal way to convince the reader that the spikes are unrelated to the reform is
25This result is consistent with empirical findings in other countries such as the U.S., where Saez (2010)
finds evidence of bunching at the first kink of the income tax for self-employed workers but not for
wage earners.
26Dube et al. (2018) interpret the bunching at round numbers and symmetry in the missing mass as
resulting from a combination of labor market power and employer mis-optimization.
27Informal conversations with accountants suggest that manipulation was not in the firm’s interest.
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to perform a manipulation test at other focal points close to 15k and show that we
pass the test when we exclude the spike. As a result, we do not think these spikes re-
flect sorting to escape the income tax. Workers located at the spike are observationally
different from other workers: they are more likely to have a contract as executives or
managers, less likely to work overtime, and exhibit less variability in their earnings
over the year. In Table 4, we perform the RDD Manipulation Test based on the discon-
tinuity in the density using local polynomial techniques (see Cattaneo et al. (2018)).
The null hypothesis is that there is no manipulation of the density at the cutoff. We
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no manipulation (p-value is 0.8105), which thus
supports the validity of the RDD. We find no statistical evidence of systematic manip-
ulation of the running variable.
Another requirement for identification is for workers with incomes just below and
just above the discontinuity to be comparable. If people are not sorting in the neigh-
borhood of the threshold, we would expect the distribution of pre-determined charac-
teristics Xi to be smooth around 15k. This motivates a test for whether a discontinuity
in average Xi exists at Ri = 15k. In Figure A9, we show, however, that there is no vis-
ible discontinuity in the age, gender, marital status, and number of children of wage
earners at 15k.
The graphical evidence presented suggests that incumbent workers are comparable
around the cutoff and that they could not game the policy by modifying past wage
earnings to take advantage of the tax cut after it was announced. This finding is crucial
for the validity of the subsequent RDD analysis.
6 First Stage and Salience
6.1 First stage change in marginal and average tax rates
For our research design to work, we must first show that tax rates changed sharply
around the discontinuity. Recall that since we are not using income tax data, it is not
possible to formally test for this. However, we can use our tax calculator to impute
tax liabilities at the worker level and empirically show how large the first-stage effects
are.28 For several reasons, we believe our exercise is a very good approximation of the
true tax withheld both before and after the reform. First, the earnings variable that we
have in the data is the one that employers actually use to calculate tax withholdings.
Second, to compute a worker’s personal exemptions, we observe whether the worker
has a spouse and dependents. Third, we already showed that workers were not able
28To go from pre-tax gross earnings to taxable earnings, we subtract 17% for social security contribu-
tions, personal exemptions, and other minor deductions using the values reported in the law.
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to manipulate the running variable. Fourth, all the workers with incomes below 15k
had incentives to enforce and claim the income tax exemption after the reform, which
implies that their tax liability will drop to zero. Finally, the policy rule was transparent
and based on prior wage earnings, and salaries are reported by employers. Hence, the
tax agency could easily cross-check whether workers with incomes to the right of 15k
were cheating to pay lower taxes. Moreover, cheating would be difficult to pull off
because it would require some sort of collusion with employers, who are in charge of
withholding and filing taxes on workers’ behalf.
Figure 3 shows marginal tax rates (panel a) and average tax rates (panel b) before,
during, and after the tax change. This is done for single workers with no children,
but a similar pattern emerges for other groups. The brown line shows the tax rates in
August 2013 before the tax holiday began, the blue lines correspond to December 2014
and 2015 when the tax change was in place, and the red line corresponds to the tax
rates by December 2016 after the tax break was repealed. We compute the mean of the
tax rates by bins of the running variable on the x-axis. Since the running variable is
constructed using the highest monthly wage in the first eight months of 2013, there is
a distribution of taxes and earnings for each value of the running variable.29
Workers with incomes below 15k experienced a temporary tax cut on their entire
income, and workers with incomes above 15k experienced a tax hike due to inflation
and “bracket creep”. Panel (a) shows that the marginal tax rate of single workers earn-
ing slightly less than 15k pesos decreased from about 25% to 0%, and panel (b) shows
that the ratio of withheld taxes to gross earnings dropped from about 7% to 0% imme-
diately after the tax break was implemented. By contrast, two years after the reform,
the marginal tax rate for workers with incomes slightly to the right of 15k increased
from 25% to 30%, and the average tax rate went from 7% to 12%. Interestingly, both
marginal and average tax rates converged to their pre-reform levels once the tax holi-
day was reversed. Hence, this graph illustrates how the reform (and lack of indexing)
effectively created groups of workers that coexisted in the same labor market but faced
sharply different tax rates. We next show that, in addition to this large first-stage effect,
the tax change was also highly salient and well advertised.
6.2 A simple and salient tax change
For a tax change to affect work incentives, it must be simple and salient to the worker.
Otherwise, one could argue that workers do not react because they are not aware of the
variation or because the change is too complicated to understand. However, neither
argument is compelling for the policy we studied, for the following reasons:
29This is the reason why the tax schedule does not exhibit the standard piecewise linear shape. See
Figure A8 for a simulation using current monthly wages on the horizontal axis.
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First, unlike other comprehensive reforms, this one was easy to understand: if the
worker happened to have an income below the discontinuity, she no longer had to
worry about the income tax for some time. No complicated calculations or changes in
the tax base were involved. In fact, firm accountants were in charge of computing the
assignment variable and enforcing the targeted tax holiday.
Second, in addition to the standard saliency checks reported in other tax studies
(e.g., Google searches, such as that shown in Figure A10, or newspaper coverage as
shown in Figure A11), the tax change analyzed in this paper was unique in that it
was widely covered by nationwide TV networks.30 The President made a public an-
nouncement with live TV coverage in a meeting where the head of the IRS, main labor
union leaders, and business associations were present (panels a and b of Figure 4).
Moreover, a day after the announcement, the IRS issued a memo explaining who was
benefited and how to compute the assignment variable. The details of this memo were
amply discussed on TV newscasts by journalists and the head of the IRS (panels c, d,
e, and f of Figure 4).
Third, in Argentina, workers can see in their monthly pay stub whether they are
subject to the income tax and the amount withheld. In particular, the Executive Order
mandated the inclusion of two lines in the pay stub of tax-exempt workers, one line
with the amount that should be withheld had the tax holiday not existed, and another
line with the same amount credited back. So workers with incomes slightly below
the discontinuity experienced an immediate increase in their take-home pay between
August and September 2013 that was very visible in their pay stub and bank account.
This is an important difference from other European tax holidays where workers usu-
ally continue paying taxes from the previous year, potentially blurring the incentives
to work more during the tax-free period.
Figure 5 shows an example of a pay stub from a wage earner working in the private
sector who benefited from the reform. The pay stub corresponds to September 2015,
two years after the tax holiday began. Gross wage earnings before taxes and social
security contributions were AR$ 15,699.6. This is the number that we observe in the
data. We also highlight in yellow the two lines related to the income tax. The first
line shows that this worker should have paid an income tax of AR$ 4,487.4, but this
amount is exactly offset in the following line due to Decree 1242/2013. With such a
tax liability, the marginal tax rate for this worker should have been 31% instead of 0%.
Tax savings amount to 28.6% of this worker’s gross monthly wage.
30Hoopes et al. (2015) use Google and Wikipedia searches regarding the U.S. income tax to show that
policy changes and exogenous shocks to tax salience drive taxpayer information search.
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7 Results
7.1 Aggregate response of wage earners
We now turn to the main empirical findings of the paper and analyze labor supply
responses of wage earners to the temporary tax holiday. Figure 6 displays average
annual wage earnings in the year 2015 by bins of the running variable for the pool
of wage earners around the discontinuity.31 From this figure, it can be seen that, two
years after the tax cut was put in place and right before it was reversed, there is no
visible discontinuity in annual earnings around the 15k cutoff. This result suggests
that upper-wage earners did not respond to either the tax cut (those with incomes
below 15k) or to the tax hike due to bracket creep (those with incomes above 15k).
To get a sense of the magnitude of such a small response, in Figure 7 we present a
thought experiment concerning what the observed earnings change should have been
with a labor supply elasticity of 0.3, which is in the ballpark of what other papers
have estimated (e.g., see the meta-analysis by Keane (2011)).32 For comparison, we
superimpose the simulated response (blue dots) on the observed response (gray dots).
The figure clearly shows that if the elasticity were 0.3, it would yield a large, visible
discontinuity in annual earnings. Moreover, the reduced-form estimate computed by
comparing workers with incomes to the left and to the right of the discontinuity would
be AR$ 20,595 additional annual earnings (about USD 3,500), which is much higher
than the observed response of AR$ 638.33
The span of our data allows us to run the analysis for some years before (2011 and
2012), during (2014 and 2015), and after (2016 and 2017) the reform. The two years
before the reform serve as a placebo test, and the two years after the repeal allow us to
test for asymmetric responses when the tax holiday is gone and workers with incomes
below the discontinuity start paying taxes again. A convenient way to visually detect
small changes is to use earnings growth instead of earnings level as the dependent
variable. In Figure 8, we present average growth of annual earnings relative to 2013
within equally spaced bins of AR$ 500.34 For comparison, we keep the scale of the
31Although the data are reported at the month level, we aggregate earnings at the annual level because
doing so captures all the income components received throughout the year, beyond regular payments,
that might respond differently for workers below and above the cutoff (e.g., annual bonuses), and it
also absorbs idiosyncratic seasonalities from the jobs.
32Earnings are shifted by 0.3×%∆(1− τit), where τit is the individual empirical MTR before (August
2013) and after (December 2015) the reform. Note that predicted earnings above the discontinuity
decrease because of the bracket creep effect. We assume no income effects.
33RD estimates throughout the paper are computed with the rdrobust routine from Calonico et al.
(2017).
34Earnings growth is computed at the individual level and averaged within bin. Note that the denom-
inator, annual wages in 2013, is positive and relatively large because by design we consider wage
earners paying taxes in 2013. Hence, the growth rate does not have large outliers over time but, for
precaution, we winsorize it at the 99th percentile.
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vertical axis fixed with a range of 10 percentage points. From the panels, each of which
corresponds to a separate year, we can see that responses around the discontinuity are
close to zero.35
For completeness, we compute the RD estimates and 95% confidence intervals in
each panel of Figure 8, and we plot their evolution over time in Figure 9. Reassur-
ingly, the RD estimates are statistically zero before the reform came into force, which
supports the validity of our research design. More importantly, the time series shows
a very precisely estimated small increase in earnings in 2014 and 2015 that fades away
in 2016 and 2017 after the tax holiday was repealed.
In column 1 of Table 5, we report the RD estimates and standard errors for the
year 2015. Panel A shows the reduced-form percentage change in earnings around the
discontinuity, panel B shows the percentage change in the net-of-marginal tax rates,
and panel C presents the elasticity which essentially scales the reduced-form by its
first stage. The elasticity is calculated using a two-stage fuzzy RD procedure.36 From
panel A, we can see that workers benefited from the tax holiday exhibit an excess
earnings growth of 0.4%, which translates to a small and precisely estimated elasticity
of 0.017. For comparison, the elasticity of 0.3 that we used in the thought experiment
would yield a reduced-form excess earnings growth of 7.5% in Figure 9.
Finally, we analyze whether the small response is driven by relatively rigid or flex-
ible components of a worker’s compensation. Recall that employers report total wage
earnings and they also decompose it into subcomponents such as base salary, overtime
pay, productivity bonuses, vacation pay, etc. The data that we have access to allow us
to look at each of these subcomponents, but only in April and October of each year.
At the annual level, however, we have access to total wage earnings and base salary.
The difference between these two measures thus captures any compensation that the
worker gets beyond the base salary during the year. This “residual” is an outcome that
the worker could presumably adjust more flexibly relative to the base salary, which is
typically predetermined by labor unions. Thus, we decompose the aggregate result
from Figure 9, based on total wage earnings, into two subcomponents: the base salary
and the residual. To avoid dealing with zeroes, we first compute the share of these two
outcomes in total wage earnings at the individual level, and then estimate the RD co-
35Annual earnings growth is negative in the figures because we include workers with zero earnings.
That is, the base year 2013 contains workers with positive wage earnings in the reference period
of January-August 2013 and we replace pre-reform and post-reform wage earnings with zeroes if the
worker is out of the labor force. In that way, the analysis captures the intensive as well as the extensive
margin.
36For the change in the net-of-tax rate, we adopt a conservative approach and use individual-level
marginal tax rates in August 2013 (pre) and December 2013 (post). Using marginal tax rates in 2015
could potentially capture behavioral responses of workers with incomes above the threshold because
bracket creep makes them face higher taxes during the period of analysis. In any case, using marginal
tax rates in 2015 would make the first-stage effect even larger and the elasticity even smaller.
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efficients.37 The evolution of the RD estimates, presented in Figure A13, suggests that
the small aggregate response is explained by relatively flexible components of wage
earnings. The residual increases its share of total compensation relative to 2013 (panel
b) and the base salary decreases its share (panel a).
To sum up, the evidence presented in this subsection supports the existence of a tiny
and precisely measured response by wage earners to a large, salient, and temporary
income tax change. This effect is driven by flexible components of workers’ compen-
sation. Note that, because the aggregate response is small, it is virtually impossible to
mask heterogeneous responses from large subgroups, which would otherwise show
up in the RD analysis. Nonetheless, the aggregate response could still be masking
large responses by small groups or pay components that represent a small share of to-
tal wage earnings. In the following subsections, we focus on outcomes and subgroups
where responses could be larger.
7.2 A more flexible real margin: overtime hours
Overtime work is an important yet relatively unexplored channel of response to taxa-
tion. In our setting, overtime is a particularly interesting outcome because it is subject
to more worker discretion. One could argue that, even if an employee works under a
rigid 8-hour-per-day contract, there could be some space to choose how many over-
time hours to supply. In that sense, we expect overtime hours to be more flexible than
regular hours and, therefore, more likely to respond to tax changes. Note, however,
that labor demand restrictions could still be at play because overtime hours are costly
for employers who must pay a premium of 100-150%.38 Although administrative data
typically do not contain information on working hours, in our data we do observe
overtime hours and overtime pay, because employers are required to report them every
month when they file social security contributions.39 The availability of data on such
rare outcomes provides a unique opportunity to learn about their response to taxation
using our rigorous design. In addition, overtime hours is the only “pure” real labor
supply measure that we have at hand and, thus, plays a key role in the analysis.
We start by showing a precise zero effect of the tax holiday on the likelihood of
working overtime, and then proceed to the intensive margin where we find a positive,
37About 5% of the sample in the RD had zero residual income (i.e., total wage earnings equal to base
salary). In addition, some workers have low residual income values and, therefore, interannual
growth can become extremely large. That is why we find it more natural to work with shares in
this exercise.
38See section 2.3 for more details on the regulation of overtime work.
39With these variables at hand one can also construct the overtime premium and compute hourly wages
for overtime workers. These outcomes allow us to study the standard economic incidence channel:
whether the tax change depressed hourly wages in response to an increase in hours. We address this
threat later in the paper.
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albeit small, effect on hours. For the first outcome, we use an indicator for whether
workers have positive overtime pay, which is available for April, August, and October
of every year. Figure 10 panel (a) plots the fraction of individuals working overtime by
bins of the running variable and fits a quadratic line on each side of the discontinuity
for one month before the reform (April 2013), one month during the reform (April
2015), and one month after the repeal (April 2017). This figure shows that overtime
is a very common practice among workers affected by the reform (40% of individuals
worked overtime hours in April 2013), but the tax holiday does not seem to have any
effect on the extensive margin as no visible discontinuity emerges at 15k.40 Panel (b)
plots the evolution of the RD estimates and the 95% confidence interval computed at
every month for which overtime pay is available. The precise zero result from this
graph implies that the tax holiday did not induce wage earners with incomes below
the discontinuity to start working overtime.
We next turn to the intensive margin response of overtime hours to taxation where
we find small, positive effects (Figure 11). In this case, we only have access to overtime
hours for April and October of each year. The dependent variable in the RD is the
difference between overtime hours in each month-year and overtime hours in April
2013. Panel (a) shows the comparison between October 2015 and April 2013 by bins of
the running variable and fits a linear regression on each side of the discontinuity. This
is the month-year in which we get the highest effect and the figure shows that tax-
exempt wage earners worked 1.12 more overtime hours in October 2015 relative to
workers who remained subject to the income tax.41 Panel (b) plots the evolution of the
RD estimates computed at every month for which overtime hours are available. We
can see that, before the reform, overtime hours do not differ around the discontinuity,
but a positive effect slowly emerges as soon as the tax holiday is implemented, and it
decreases smoothly after the reform is reversed.
In Table 5 column 2, we report the RD estimates and standard errors for 2015. We
scale the reduced-form change in hours by average overtime hours in April 2013 (26.3
hours at 15k), and then compute the elasticity by scaling it again with the percentage
change in the net-of-MTR. The elasticity of overtime hours to taxation is 0.184. This is
much larger than the wage earnings elasticity of 0.017 reported in the previous sub-
section. Nonetheless, the elasticity would still be small if we included (unobserved)
regular hours in the computation of the percentage change.
To sum up, the previous exercise showed that overtime work is common; 40% of
40Note that the profiles shift down over time due to the business cycle, but do not shift differentially
for workers with incomes below and above the discontinuity. In appendix Figure A14, we report
summary statistics for the universe of wage earners. About 17% of individuals work overtime with
an average of 25 overtime hours per month and a 13% average share of total wage earnings.
41The reason why the dependent variable is negative is because we include the zeroes and by construc-
tion the sample at the baseline, April 2013, has positive wage earnings.
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individuals work overtime. In principle, therefore, the standard labor supply model
would argue that wage earners have room to increase working hours in response to
tax changes, and they do increase them, but just a little bit. This may indicate that labor
demand restrictions are at play such that workers are not free to vary the number of
hours that they work (e.g., many facilities require some fixed level of overtime from
employees in order to run operations continuously).
It is striking how little evidence there is of overtime responses to taxation. Two
reasons for this are that it is an outcome rarely reported in administrative data and
it is hard to find good identifying variation.42 The scant economic literature that has
analyzed overtime is entirely based on labor surveys. To the best of our knowledge,
the only empirical paper on this topic is Cahuc and Carcillo (2014), which studies labor
supply responses to the detaxation of overtime pay introduced in France in 2007 using
survey data and a difference-in-differences approach.43 In that sense, the results from
this subsection are interesting in themselves and provide important lessons for other
countries that view overtime hours as an effective way to increase the number of hours
worked (e.g., Austria, Belgium, and France).
7.3 Two responsive subgroups: job switchers and managers
In this subsection, we focus on two subgroups that are expected to be more responsive
to taxation: jobs switchers and managers.
Job switchers. The tax status of workers moving to a new firm was tied to monthly
wages earned in the previous job (the highest monthly wage between January and
August 2013). Hence, it could be the case that while workers could not be paid more
on the current job because the contract was already written, they could perhaps switch
to another job that paid better (and may require more work).
Figure 12 presents the RD analysis for the likelihood of switching (extensive mar-
gin) and the excess earnings growth (intensive margin) around the discontinuity. We
define switchers as workers whose firm identifier in December of a year differs from
the firm identifier they had when the reform took place in 2013. Panel (a) plots the
fraction of switchers by bins of the running variable for two years during the tax holi-
day (2014 and 2015) and two years after (2016 and 2017).44 It also includes a quadratic
42Brown and Hamermesh (2019) argue that U.S. overtime laws do not provide as fertile a field for
evaluating policy as does the regulation of wages and, therefore, it is not surprising that very little
research on overtime has been produced in the U.S. in the last decade.
43A theoretical treatment of overtime decisions in response to tax changes can be found in Frederiksen
et al. (2008). Overtime responses to net wage changes have also been explored earlier in the 1990s
by Trejo (1991) and in other work recently summarized by Brown and Hamermesh (2019). However,
these papers are mainly focused on the effect of overtime pay provisions on total work hours and the
incidence on regular hourly wages through demand-side forces.
44By design, the measure in 2015 includes workers switching in 2014 and 2015, the measure in 2016
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fit on each side of the discontinuity. Panel (b) plots the evolution of the RD estimates
for wage earnings growth relative to 2013. The green line corresponds to wage earners
who switched firms by December 2015 and the blue line corresponds to wage earners
who remained at the same firm through December 2015.
Figure 12 shows that the tax change did not affect the likelihood of switching jobs,
but conditional on switching, it seems that tax-exempt workers negotiated more favor-
able monthly wages. Table 5 column 3 reports the point estimates and wage earnings
elasticity for the year 2015. The elasticity for this subgroup is 0.096, an order of mag-
nitude larger than the 0.017 elasticity estimated for the pool of wage earners, but still
quite small when compared to other estimates in the literature. Our evidence thus
suggests that employees switching jobs seem to negotiate new contracts differently
based on their income tax status.45 These findings for switchers versus stayers might
imply that wage earners are constrained. That is, they do not get to choose how many
hours they work over the course of the year. Workers are basically stuck in a job for
which the contract states how much they work and how much they earn, making it
hard to adjust their labor supply in response to net wage changes.
Managers and executives. Another interesting case study is given by executives
and managers because they have a broader income base to respond to tax changes
than does the typical employee, and they are closer to the board of directors who set
their pay. In most organizations, the compensation mix for executives usually dif-
fers from other workers’ pay. An executive’s package typically includes a fixed part
and variable part. The fixed part consists of a regular monthly salary (accounting for
50-70% of total income) and the variable part can include honoraria, annual bonuses,
profit sharing, equity shares, etc.46 For the fixed part, employers must withhold in-
come taxes at the source and, for the variable part, managers must file an annual tax
return as independent workers.47 Key to our analysis is that, if the portion paid as
wage earnings was below the discontinuity, then executives qualified for the tax holi-
day on any compensation paid as wage earnings. Hence, this group had an incentive
to shift their compensation mix toward wages because wages remained untaxed for
2.5 years. Furthermore, this practice did not entail a higher labor cost for employers
because executives usually make social security contributions as independent work-
ers and, thus, anything paid as wage earnings is exempt from employer and employee
includes workers switching in 2014, 2015, and 2016, etc.
45We cannot rule out that workers pick jobs with a different combination of wage and non-wage aspects
too.
46For instance, a common practice in Argentina is for managers to receive honoraria in advance during
the year, payments that the firm formally recognizes as an expense in April of the following year
before the fiscal year ends. These payments are treated as self-employment income and thus taxed
under a different regime.
47Capital gains of non-publicly (privately) traded stocks were taxed at 15% and capital gains of publicly
traded stocks faced no tax. In addition, dividends faced a temporary 10% tax between September 2013
and July 2016.
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payroll taxes. So, for this particular subgroup, wage earnings adjustments were easier
to accommodate.
In Figure 13 we analyze wage earnings responses from managers and executives.
In our data, employees performing managerial duties are reported under a different
type of contract than are other wage earners and thus are easy to flag. This is because
their wage earnings are not subject to payroll taxes and, thus, the IRS uses a separate
category for this group. We use this flag to identify them and then track their annual
wage earnings for the period 2011-2017. In this case, we run a difference-in-differences
analysis because the RDD is somewhat underpowered due to its small sample size.48
In the treatment group, we include managers with a running variable between AR$
10,000 and AR$ 15,000 (untaxed) and, in the control group, we place managers with a
running variable between AR$ 15,000 and AR$ 25,000 (taxed). Panel (a) shows average
annual earnings for both groups and panel (b) reports the evolution of the diff-in-diff
estimates using wage earnings growth relative to 2013 as the dependent variable.
Figure 13 shows parallel trends before the tax holiday was implemented and, more
importantly, a sharp increase in the wage earnings of managers located in the tax ben-
efit zone relative to those who continued paying taxes normally. The reduced-form
increase in wage earnings builds up slowly, reaching almost 8% in 2015, and fades
away smoothly when the tax change is reversed.49 The point estimates for the year
2015 are reported in Table 5 column 4. The wage earnings elasticity for managers is
0.311, which is substantially higher than the 0.017 elasticity estimated for the pool of
wage earners.
This finding shows that, among the group of generally unresponsive wage earners,
managers seem to be quite responsive to income taxation. This result can be linked
to recent work by Piketty et al. (2014) who decompose the taxable income elasticity
into real responses, bargaining effects, and avoidance behavior. These authors argue
that the negative relationship between marginal tax rates and CEO pay is likely due to
bargaining effects (i.e., stronger bargaining by top earners when top MTRs are low).
Whether our large response is due to bargaining/reporting effects rather than to pro-
ductive effort remains an open question. Nonetheless, managers’ closer ties with the
board of directors, the broader compensation package, and the favorable tax treatment
of wage earnings make the avoidance story more plausible.
Other subgroups. The richness of the data allows us to zoom in on other subpop-
ulations that are typically considered to have more flexibility in their labor supply
choices. For example, public sector workers usually face a relatively more fixed work-
ing schedule than do private sector workers (e.g., in some ministries, it is not possible
48The RD results are similar but noisier and can be found in Appendix Figure A15.
49The reason why such a large effect is not visible when using the full sample, is because managers
represent a small share of total wage earners affected by the tax change.
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to work overtime). Similarly, the literature typically finds larger elasticities for women
than for men (Keane, 2011).50 Workers not covered by labor unions could adjust their
working hours more easily. Older workers could delay retirement to take advantage
of the tax holiday. Coordination between workers and employers could be easier in
small- or medium-sized firms. Workers whose contracts do not stipulate full-time em-
ployment might have more space to respond, etc. Nonetheless, as pointed out above,
because the aggregate response in the RD analysis is small, it is virtually impossible to
find a large subgroup responding strongly to the tax holiday.
We run the RD analysis for these subgroups of workers for the year 2015 and sum-
marize the wage earnings elasticities and confidence intervals in Figure 14. Panel
(a) displays the elasticities for different demographic groups and panel (b) decom-
poses the aggregate result down by employment characteristics. Ppanel (a) shows that
women, married employees with children, and young workers are more elastic. Panel
(b) shows a higher elasticity for workers without full-time contracts—a group that in-
cludes managers and executives—and for workers at small- and medium-sized firms
where coordination might be easier. The magnitude of these elasticities, however, are
all fairly small.
8 Entry Effects
We now show that the tax change induced some high-wage earners entering the la-
bor market to do so strategically below the eligibility threshold to qualify for the tax
holiday. To that end, we construct the sample of “new entrants” to include those who
were not present in our data between January and August 2013 and appear afterwards
(i.e., non-wage earners in the reference period). We also construct a “placebo sample”
for the pre-reform period comprising wage earners who were not present in our data
between January and August 2010 and appear afterwards.51 It is worth noting that,
in principle, these samples not only include entrants without an employment history,
but also those who for some reason were not employed during the reference period,
or those who were employed under a different regime (e.g., the simplified regime for
independent workers, or the general regime for firm owners).
One natural way to show the entry effects would be to use the bunching to notches
approach (Kleven and Waseem, 2013), where one compares the excess mass below
AR$ 15,000 and the missing mass above AR$ 15,000.52 There are two factors, however,
50Chetty et al. (2011) show that bunching at kinks is greater for married women than for single men.
Gelber (2014) also finds higher elasticities for married women than men.
51We restrict the sample to workers that stay at least 5 months in the new job and work in at most 3
firms during the period of analysis. This is a sensible condition that lets us exclude seasonal workers
entering the labor market for a few months that are not affected by the income tax.
52Recall that new entrants were fully exempt from the income tax if their monthly wage at the starting
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that complicate its use. Both factors are depicted in Figure 15, where we plot the
distribution of the starting monthly wage for all the entrants in the pre-reform year
2013 (blue line) and the reform year 2015 (red line). The first factor is that 15k was
a very high monthly entry wage in 2013, leaving very little mass around the notch
when the reform was implemented (only 2% of entrants earned above 15k).53 Hence,
in practice, this threshold was only binding for top wage earners with the potential
to enter in that zone. The second factor is that, although the notch is nominally fixed
at 15k, and we do observe some bunching at the notch (panel b), it is hard to apply
static bunching techniques in an inflationary context because the distribution and its
composition shift constantly to the right as labor unions and firms renegotiate nominal
wages to keep up with inflation.54
An alternative way to show the entry effects, which circumvents low frequency
at 15k and dynamic adjustments in the distribution, is to work with the cumulative
distribution function instead of the probability density function. For every month of
our data, we compute the share of workers entering above 15k and then plot the time
series in Figure 16. This strategy provides a visual test of the speed at which the mass
accumulates above 15k over time. Of particular interest is the repeal of the tax holiday
in February 2016, because by that date the 15k threshold had become more operative
and, therefore, one would expect a trend break in the fraction of wage earners entering
above 15k before and after the policy was reversed.
Three elements are worth noting in Figure 16 panel (a). First, at the time the re-
form was implemented, it was indeed rare for workers to enter the labor market with
a monthly wage higher than AR$ 15,000. Second, between September 2013 and Febru-
ary 2016, the blue line takes off and the red line remains relatively stable, meaning
that most wage earners were entering in the 10k-15k zone. Third, the red line shows a
trend break when the notch was removed in February 2016, which means that work-
ers suddenly started to enter above that threshold, which was now irrelevant for tax
purposes. Panel (b) repeats this exercise for managers and executives, a group that
exhibited the largest responses in the intensive margin analysis. Strategic entrance in
this case is even more striking, with sharp changes in the CDF at the two key dates.
In Figure 17, we refine the previous analysis by constructing a counterfactual CDF
(blue line), computed based on annual inflation, that is superimposed on the observed
CDF (red line). For this predicted share, we take the distribution of initial monthly
wage earnings in 2013, shift it backward and forward in time using the Argentine
month was lower than AR$ 15,000, regardless of subsequent income. Hence, the region above 15k
was strictly dominated.
53In August 2013, the average entry salary was AR$ 5,200 (AR$ 8,850 in 2015; AR$ 11,200 in 2016) and
the overall average monthly wage was AR$ 8,200.
54According to the official wage index, RIPTE, the average nominal increase of wage earnings was 32%
in 2013-2014, 33% in 2014-2015, 32% in 2015-2016, and 29% in 2016-2017.
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wage index (RIPTE), and then we compute the share of wage earners that fall above
AR$ 15,000. Panel (a) shows the share of new entrants and panel (b) reports the excess
number of predicted workers above 15k relative to the observed number of workers
above that notch. The estimates reported in panel (b) signify, for example, that in 2015
the predicted number of workers entering above 15k was 30% larger than the observed
number. The figure shows that the gap between the predicted and the observed num-
ber of entrants increases during the tax holiday and decreases when the tax change is
reversed. We interpret this result as evidence that workers entered strategically below
the notch to avoid the income tax.
We close this section by focusing on some reference entry points that help to make
the wage manipulation story more compelling. In this case, to smooth out the noise
in the data, we calculate the average number of entrants per month. That is, we first
count the number of wage earners in each month entering exactly at a focal point and
then compute the monthly average for different years. We focus on four reference
points: two that qualify for the tax holiday, 10k and 15k, and two that do not qualify,
20k and 25k. Figure A16 shows a clear response to the tax notch as the mass at 15k
increases during 2014 and 2015 relative to the other focal points, and decreases in 2016
and 2017 when the tax change was reversed. In contrast, the mass at 20k and 25k
remains relatively stable until 2015 and then increases sharply when entrance below
15k is no longer advantageous. In Figure A17, we decompose the previous figure by
executives versus the rest of the entrants to show that this manipulation is mostly
driven by executives. For instance, in 2015, about 50% of the executives entering in
the range of 10k-15k are bunched exactly at 15k while, for the rest of the entrants,
the share in that zone entering exactly at 15k is less than 1%. So manipulation of
starting monthly wages is higher for executives, a result that is in line with the elastic
wage earnings response documented in section 7.3. The greater responsiveness of this
group could be explained by non-standard contracts that let them coordinate salary
payments more easily with their employers.
To sum up, notwithstanding the low frequency of entrants around 15k when the
reform was implemented, the evidence from this section supports the claim that high-
wage earners were aware of the reform and that some were able to manipulate their
first monthly wage to enter below the discontinuity and escape from the income tax.
This behavior is more pronounced for executives and managers.
9 Competing Explanations and Discussion
The analysis thus far has shown negligible aggregate responses of high-wage earners
to a large tax change, but somewhat larger effects for certain flexible outcomes and
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subgroups. What drives these results? Below, we explore some competing explana-
tions.
Lack of saliency. One could argue that workers did not react because the reform
was not very salient or well understood. We believe that the aggregate null result
is not attributable to lack of saliency. In section 6.2, we showed that the tax change
was highly publicized and the details were amply discussed by the IRS and journal-
ists. Moreover, the unusually large change in marginal and average tax rates, and
the mandatory inclusion of the tax credit on pay stubs, made this tax change much
more visible than standard tax reforms. Unlike typical tax reforms, our tax variation
was simple for workers to understand. It did not require any understanding of the
tax code, only that if a worker happened to have wage income below the discontinu-
ity, she no longer had to worry about taxes (at least until the presidential election in
December 2015).
Poor enforcement/compliance. We argue that the aggregate null result is not ex-
plained by poor enforcement of the eligibility rules. Employers and their accountants,
who calculate and file monthly withholdings on behalf of workers, were in charge of
computing the running variable and could face severe penalties from the Argentine
IRS for placing workers on the wrong side of the discontinuity. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that accountants followed the eligibility rules closely to avoid such penalties.
In the appendix, we present evidence from two anonymous firms, one medium-sized
and one large, that shared detailed payroll data, and we find 100% compliance around
the discontinuity (see Figures A27 and A30).
An incidence story. It could be that employees indeed worked longer hours but em-
ployers lowered their wage rate, leaving monthly wage earnings unchanged. Figure
A18 presents evidence against this labor demand channel. We compute RD estimates
using hourly wages as the dependent variable and plot the evolution for the period
2012-2017. We use a sample of overtime workers, for whom we observe monthly
hours and pay, to compute wage rates. The figure shows a very precise zero effect,
suggesting that the null labor response cannot be explained by an incidence story.
Substitution and income effects cancel out. From the standard model of labor
supply, we know that income tax changes create substitution effects (SE) and income
effects (IE) on work effort that move in opposite directions. Some people believe the
SE to be small relative to the IE and others believe the converse. Such differences of
opinion arise to a considerable extent because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable
evidence (Giupponi, 2019). Cesarini et al. (2017) argue that income effects are smaller
for old individuals.55 So, do we see that old workers are more responsive, with a large
substitution effect only partially masked by a small income effect? We perform the ag-
55In Panel C of Table 5 the authors show that the income effect varies with age and is higher for young
workers. The table shows that the income effect is cut in half by age 50.
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gregate RD analysis separately for four age subgroups and find evidence inconsistent
with this argument (Figure A19). If anything, the figure shows a slightly greater effect
for young workers (panel a).
Frictions and rigidities. The modern economic literature acknowledges that sev-
eral factors might attenuate observed responses to taxation, such as fixed adjustment
costs and contracts that restrict workers’ choices regarding how many hours to work
(Rogerson, 2011; Rogerson and Wallenius, 2013; Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, 2012).
Large adjustment costs to a change in labor supply (e.g., search costs or adjusting
hours of work) can slow wage earners’ dynamic responses to a tax holiday.
Importantly, Argentina has a very rigid labor market compared to OECD and other
South American countries. In Figures A20 and A21, we present cross-country evi-
dence to shed some light on labor market rigidities using comparable data from the
World Economic Forum. The Argentine labor market is comparable in its rigidity to
central European countries such as France and Italy that are highly unionized. The
high rigidities could be one factor limiting the response of wage earners to net wage
changes.
Labor demand constraints. Labor choices do not occur in a vacuum and usu-
ally require some coordination between employers and employees, further limiting a
worker’s choice set (see for instance Kreiner et al. (2016)). The larger effects we found
for job switchers, overtime hours, and new entrants might imply that wage earners are
labor-demand constrained. In the case of job switchers, workers are basically stuck in
a job for which the contract states how much they work and how much they earn,
restraining the choice of how many hours to work over the course of the year. Like-
wise, overtime is a margin that allows for some discretion in hours of work and, yet,
we find relatively small effects. This could mean that labor demand restrictions are at
play such that workers are not free to vary overtime hours (e.g., many facilities require
some fixed level of overtime to run operations continuously). The larger response of
managers and executives could be explained by their proximity to firm owners and by
a broader compensation mix that lets them adjust reported wages and hours more eas-
ily than can the typical employee. Finally, new entrants’ strategic behavior to dodge
taxes would not be possible without coordination with employers. Taken together,
our results point toward rigidities in the labor market whereby employee-employer
cooperation is needed for wage earners to respond to tax changes.
Real low responses. Another potential explanation is that upper wage earners may
indeed have a very low intensive wage earnings elasticity with respect to marginal tax
rates. In fact, the results of this paper are consistent with other papers. Saez (2010), for
example, finds that labor supply responses in the U.S. are mostly concentrated among
self-employed workers but not among wage earners, for which the implied elasticity
is zero and precisely estimated. The result is also consistent with Saez et al. (2012a)
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study of payroll taxes in Greece and Bastani and Selin (2014) study of the income tax
in Sweden. Chetty et al. (2011) also estimate very low elasticities for wage earners
in Denmark. These findings are also related to those by Zidar (2019), who shows
that lower-income groups respond more to tax cuts and that the effect of tax cuts on
employment growth for the top 10% is small. Another recent literature has looked
at earnings responses to thresholds in social security contributions (SSCs). Alvaredo
et al. (2017) exploited concave kinks in the budget set of workers due to SSC ceilings
and found no evidence of dips in the distribution of earnings. This result suggests
that taxable earnings for high-income workers are inelastic, at least for those located
near the threshold.56 However, in this case, it could be explained by relatively small
changes in marginal tax rates, though recent work by Chetty et al. (2013) estimates a
substantial impact of EITC on the intensive margin of low-income employees using
differential knowledge across regions of the U.S. They find an earnings elasticity of
0.31 in the phase-in region of the EITC schedule and 0.14 in the phase-out region.
Concluding remarks. Argentina implemented a large and salient income tax cut for
wage earners in 2013 that lasted 2.5 years. This paper used a regression discontinu-
ity design and administrative data to analyze labor supply responses of upper-wage
earners. Notwithstanding the large and salient change in marginal and average tax
rates, we find a precisely measured very small effect of the tax cut and subsequent
hike on wage earnings and other labor supply measures (e.g., overtime hours). This
finding suggests that upper wage earners were not responsive to a large, salient, and
temporary tax change. Our findings could imply that the costs of raising income taxes
in economies with more rigid labor markets are not large, at least for the intensive mar-
gin of high-wage earners and in the short run. Nevertheless, this depends crucially on
the nature of labor market frictions. If they are permanent, then the statement is cor-
rect. However, if there are adjustment costs that would be overcome for a permanent
change in the tax system, then one cannot use the small short-run responses as a guide
for permanent tax policy.
In future research, we plan to explore more rigorously the mechanisms behind
this result, study what workers did with such a large windfall (e.g., financial con-
sequences), and analyze aggregate effects in the cities that were more benefited by the
tax holiday. We also intend to run a large-scale survey of wage earners to learn more
about rigidities at the workplace and attitudes toward the income tax.
56This result holds in the Netherlands (Bosch and Micevska-Scharf, 2017), France (Bozio et al., 2017),
Germany (Müller and Neumann, 2017), and the United Kingdom (Adam et al., 2017).
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Notes: This figure plots the fraction of registered private and public wage earners with income tax
withheld at source by their employer. Vertical dashed lines denote the beginning (September 2013)
and the end (February 2016) of the tax holiday (Executive Order 1242/2013). Immediately after the tax
change was put in place, the number of wage earners paying the income tax fell from 2.3m to 1.1m.
In February 2016, the new administration repealed the tax break and increased the nontaxable income
floor to prevent a discrete jump in the number of taxpayers. But with 40% inflation, many workers
smoothly crossed the exemption floor and the number of taxpayers reverted to about 2.2m by 2017.
Source: Official numbers reported in “Informe del Jefe de Gabinete de Ministros (HCDN).”
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(b) Distribution near 15k
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Notes: This figure displays the distribution of the highest gross monthly salary between January and
August 2013 (the running variable in the RDD). Panel (a) shows the full distribution up to 35k. The
vertical lines from left to right denote the the first kink of the income tax for single workers at AR$8,360
and the two key thresholds introduced by the reform at AR$15,000 and AR$25,000. The fraction of wage
earners who became tax exempt is highlighted in green and the fraction who continued paying the tax
is highlighted in yellow and red. The stepwise blue line denotes the tax schedule for single workers
without children. Panel (b) shows the distribution of the running variable in the range 9k-21k. The blue
line includes the spikes at focal points 10k, 11k, ..., 20k, and the red line excludes these spikes. In both
panels, the bin width is AR$250.
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Figure 3: First stage change in tax rates (single workers without children)
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Notes: This figure shows the empirical first-stage change in marginal tax rates (panel a) and average
tax rates (panel b) by bins of the running variable (the highest gross monthly wage between January
and August 2013). The brown line shows the tax rates in August 2013 before the tax holiday began, the
blue lines correspond to December 2014 and 2015 when the tax change was in place, and the red line
corresponds to the tax rates by December 2016 after the tax break was repealed. Tax rates are computed
using our own tax calculator (similar to the TAXSIM in the U.S.). Workers below 15k experienced a
temporary tax cut and workers above 15k experienced a tax hike due to bracket creep.
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Figure 4: Live announcement, interviews, and TV newscasts
(a) August 27th, 2013 (b) August 27th, 2013
(c) August 28th, 2013 (d) August 28th, 2013
(e) August 30th, 2013 (f) August 30th, 2013
Notes: These images show the repercussion that the income tax change (“ganancias”) had on Argentine
television. Panel (a) shows a photo of the official meeting at which the announcement was made with
the participation of the President, the head of the IRS, and representatives of employers’ organizations
and labor unions. This announcement had live nationwide coverage on the main news channels, as
shown in panel (b) where the President is explaining the tax change. Panels (c) and (d) show the head
of the IRS in a live interview a day after the announcement where he answered questions from the
audience and provided some clarifications (e.g., that “those below 15k are not liable” (panel c) and that “it
would become operative on September 1st” (panel d)). In panels (e) and (f), a journalist is explaining the
details of the tax holiday. The screen in panel (e) reads “How to compute the AR$ 15,000 threshold” in
reference to the assignment variable. Panel (f) explains that annual bonuses are unusual payments and
should not be included in the running variable. Source: Screenshots from public YouTube videos.
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Figure 5: Pay stub of a wage earner benefited by the tax holiday (September 2015)
Notes: This figure displays the pay slip of an anonymous wage earner benefited by the reform (i.e.,
with income below the discontinuity) in September 2015. The presidential decree contained an article
requesting employers to include a line with the income tax withholding of the corresponding month,
`Income Tax Withholding' AR$ 4,487.4, and another line exactly offsetting that amount, `Benefit
Decree PEN 1242/2013' - AR$ 4,487.4, as highlighted in yellow in the figure (see Article 3, Execu-
tive Order 1242/2013). This amount represents a large fraction of this worker’s gross monthly wage.
The exchange rate between the peso and the U.S. dollar in September 2015 was 9.24 pesos per dollar.
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N- = 420121; N+ = 276404
2015
Note: This graph plots average gross annual wage earnings for 40 equally-spaced bins of the running
variable (width AR$ 250). The figure includes a linear fit on each side of the discontinuity, computed
using the rdrobust routine from Calonico et al. (2017) using a triangular kernel and a AR$3,000 band-
width. The top left corner reports the number of observations, the first-stage change in the net-of-tax
rate, and the reduced-form estimate (standard error in parentheses). Wage earnings are expressed in
constant pesos from August 2013. The exchange rate was 5.5 pesos per US dollar in August 2013.
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N- = 420121; N+ = 276404
2015
Note: This figure reproduces the observed response from the previous figure (gray dots) and super-
poses a simulated response in a frictionless world with e = 0.3 and no income effects (blue dots).
Earnings are shifted by 0.3×%∆(1− τit), where τit is the individual empirical marginal tax rate be-
fore (August 2013) and after (December 2015) the reform. The top left corner reports the observations,
the change in the net-of-tax rate, and the reduced-form estimate (standard error in parentheses). RD
estimates were computed using the rdrobust routine from Calonico et al. (2017).
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Notes: This graph plots average annual wage earnings growth relative to 2013 for 20 equally-spaced
bins (width AR$ 500) of the running variable: the highest gross monthly wage between January and
August 2013. Panels (a) and (b) correspond to two years pre-reform as a placebo test, panels (c) and
(d) correspond to the two years during which the tax holiday was fully in place, and panels (e) and
(f) correspond to two years after the reform was repealed. The sample contains private-sector workers
with positive wage earnings in the reference period of January-August 2013. All the figures include
workers with no wage earnings either before or after the reform was implemented.
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RD estimate
95% C.I.
Notes: This graph plots the evolution of the RD estimates computed in each panel of Figure 8. Each dot
corresponds to a separate standard RD regression using a linear fit on each side of the discontinuity, a
triangular kernel, and a AR$ 3,000 bandwidth. We use the rdrobust routine from Calonico et al. (2017).
The dependent variable in the RD is annual earnings growth relative to 2013. The point estimate thus
measures the excess earnings growth between workers with incomes below and above the discontinu-
ity. The vertical dashed lines indicate the beginning and the end of the targeted tax holiday. Note that
with an elasticity of e = 0.3 (thought experiment), the reduced-form point estimate would be 7.5%. The
implied elasticity for the year 2015 is reported in Table 5.
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Figure 10: RD estimates for overtime likelihood (extensive margin)
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Notes: These figures present the RD analysis for the probability of working overtime using data from
April, August, and October of each year. The dependent variable in the RD is an indicator for whether
the worker has positive overtime payments. Panel (a) shows the fraction of individuals working over-
time for 50 equally-spaced bins of the running variable (width AR$ 200). It also includes a quadratic fit
to each side of the discontinuity. Panel (b) plots the evolution of the RD estimates computed at every
month for which overtime pay is available. Each dot corresponds to a separate RD regression using a
quadratic fit on each side of the discontinuity, a triangular kernel, and a AR$ 3,000 bandwidth. We use
the rdrobust routine from Calonico et al. (2017). The vertical dashed lines indicate the beginning and
the end of the tax holiday.
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Figure 11: RD estimates for overtime hours (intensive margin)
(a) RD plot for overtime hours in October 2015
b = 1.12
s.e. = .299
N left = 170470
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RD estimate
95% C.I.
Notes: These figures report the results for overtime hours and are computed using data from April and
October of each year. The dependent variable in the RD is the difference between overtime hours in
each month-year and overtime hours in April 2013. Panel (a) shows the comparison between October
2015 and April 2013 where we observe the greatest effect. Workers with incomes to the left of the
discontinuity worked 1.12 more overtime hours in October 2015. Average monthly overtime hours at
the discontinuity were 26.3 in April 2013. Panel (b) plots the evolution of the RD estimates computed at
every month for which overtime hours are available. Each dot corresponds to a separate RD regression
using a linear fit on each side of the discontinuity, a triangular kernel, and a AR$ 3,000 bandwidth. We
use the rdrobust routine from Calonico et al. (2017). The vertical dashed lines indicate the beginning
and the end of the tax holiday.
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Figure 12: RD estimates for job switchers (extensive and intensive margin)
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Notes: These figures present the RD analysis for job switchers. We define switchers as workers with
a different firm identifier by December of each year relative to the firm identifier they had when the
reform took place in 2013. Panel (a) plots the fraction of switchers by bins of the running variable
(width AR$ 500) for two years during the tax holiday (2014 and 2015) and two years after (2016 and
2017). It also includes a quadratic fit on each side of the discontinuity. Panel (b) plots the evolution of
the RD estimates for wage earnings growth relative to 2013 (intensive margin). We use monthly wages
instead of annual wages to construct the dependent variable because switchers may undergo a period
of unemployment, artificially lowering annual earnings relative to 2013. The green line corresponds to
wage earners who switched firms by December 2015 (N=73,459) and the blue line corresponds to wage
earners who remained in the same firm through December 2015 (N=583,892). Each dot corresponds to
a separate RD regression using a linear fit on each side of the discontinuity, a triangular kernel, and a
AR$ 3,000 bandwidth. We use the rdrobust routine from Calonico et al. (2017). The vertical dashed
lines indicate the beginning and the end of the tax holiday.49
Figure 13: Wage earnings response of managers
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Notes: This figure shows wage earnings responses of managers to the income tax holiday. The treat-
ment group contains managers with a running variable between AR$ 10,000 and AR$ 15,000 (untaxed),
and the control group contains managers with a running variable between AR$ 15,000 and AR$ 25,000
(taxed). Panel (a) plots average annual earnings for both groups and panel (b) reports the evolution of
difference-in-differences estimates using wage earnings growth relative to 2013 as the dependent vari-
able. In panel (a), we scale the level of the treatment group so that it matches the level of the control
group in 2013. The point estimates for the year 2015 are reported in Table 5 column 4. The vertical
dashed lines indicate the beginning and the end of the tax holiday.
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Figure 14: Elasticities by subgroups (in 2015)













































































































Note: This figure plots wage earnings elasticities for different subgroups in the year 2015 (the last year
of the tax holiday). Each dot corresponds to a separate RD regression where the dependent variable
is annual earnings growth relative to 2013. To compute the elasticities, we scale the reduced-form
estimate by the first-stage change in the net-of-marginal tax rate around the discontinuity using a fuzzy
two-stage procedure (rdrobust routine).
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Figure 15: Distribution of initial monthly wages for new entrants
(a) Full distribution
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Notes: This graph plots the distribution of the first monthly salary for wage earners who did not have
a job during the period January-August 2013. Panel (a) plots the full distribution up to AR$ 22,000,
and panel (b) zooms in on the range AR$ 8,000-22,000. The blue line corresponds to the year 2013 and
the red line to the year 2015. The vertical dashed line indicates the discontinuity at 15k. During the
tax holiday (August 2013-February 2016), workers who enter the labor market with an income below
15k escape the tax whereas those who enter with incomes above 15k are subject to the tax, regardless,
in either case, of the worker’s wage income beyond the first month. The distribution shifts to the right
over time due to high inflation and corresponding wage adjustments. In both years of panel (a), the first
spike corresponds to the federal minimum wage and the second spike to the base salary in the retail
sector.
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Figure 16: Share of entrants with initial monthly wage above 10k, 15k





































































































































Notes: This graph plots the fraction of wage earners entering the labor market with their first monthly
wage above AR$ 15,000 (red line) and above AR$ 10,000 (blue line). This fraction is computed at every
month-year of our data. The sample of entrants consists of workers not present in the data between
January and August 2013 who appear afterwards. For the pre-reform period, we use wage earners
not present in the data between January and August 2010 who appear afterwards. The blue line is a
superset that includes the red line as well. The difference between these lines thus contains the mass
of entrants with monthly wages between 10k-15k. The vertical dashed lines indicate the beginning and
the end of the tax holiday. The black solid lines in panel (a) denote linear fits that highlight the trend
break of mass above AR$ 15,000 during and after the reform. For workers entering with incomes above
10k, the slope goes from 0.0118 (0.0006) to 0.0147 (0.0013) and for workers entering with incomes above
15k, the slope goes from 0.0032 (0.0002) to 0.0153 (0.0013). Panel (a) includes the pool of entrants and
panel (b) zooms in on managers and executives entering the labor market as wage earners.
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Figure 17: Observed and predicted share of workers entering with income above 15k
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Notes: This graph compares the observed share of workers entering with incomes above AR$ 15,000 to
a predicted share based on annual inflation. For the predicted share, we take the distribution of initial
monthly wage earnings in 2013, shift it backward and forward in time using the RIPTE index, and then
compute the share of entrants with incomes that fall above AR$ 15,000. Panel (a) shows the fraction of
total entrants and panel (b) reports the excess in the number of predicted workers with income above
15k relative to the observed number of workers with income above 15k. The vertical dashed lines
indicate the beginning and the end of the tax holiday.
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Table 1: Personal Income Tax Schedule in Argentina (annual)
Annual Taxable Income Annual Tax Payment
from AR$ to AR$ AR$ + over AR$
0 10,000 - 9% 0
10,000 20,000 900 14% 10,000
20,000 30,000 2,300 19% 20,000
30,000 60,000 4,200 23% 30,000
60,000 90,000 11,100 27% 60,000
90,000 120,000 19,200 31% 90,000
120,000 28,500 35% 120,000
Notes: This table shows the personal income tax schedule in Argentina that was in place during the pe-
riod 2000-2016. Taxable income refers to adjusted gross income net of personal exemptions and general
deductions. Taxable thresholds have been fixed in nominal terms since the year 2000.
Table 2: Schedule used by employers to compute monthly withholdings
Taxable Income at month M Cumulated Tax at month M
from AR$ to AR$ AR$ + over AR$
0 833×M 0 9% 0
833×M 1,667×M 75×M 14% 833×M
1,667×M 2,500×M 191.67×M 19% 1,667×M
2,500×M 5,000×M 350×M 23% 2,500×M
5,000×M 7,500×M 925×M 27% 5,000×M
7,500×M 10,000×M 1600×M 31% 7,500×M
10,000×M 2375×M 35% 10,000×M
Notes: This table shows the personal income tax schedule that employers use to compute monthly
withholdings. It is a monthly version of the annual schedule presented in Table 1. Under the Cu-
mulative Withholding Method, employers compute Taxable Income at month M based on cumulated
earnings (zit) and cumulated deductions and allowances: TIiM = ∑Mt=1 zit − ∑Mt=1 SSCit − deductions12 ×
M− exemptions12 ×M. They then take TIiM to this table, calculate the cumulated tax up to month M, and
subtract withholdings from previous months: WithholdingiM = Cumul_taxiM − Cumul_taxiM−1.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for Argentine wage earners and estimation sample, 2013
All 10k-15k 15k-25k 14k-16k
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of total wage earners 1 0.142 0.089 0.036
Decile earnings Jan-Aug’13 1-10 8 9 8-9
Age 40.4 43.1 45.7 44.6
Public worker 0.310 0.410 0.454 0.421
Unionized 0.492 0.452 0.459 0.460
Female 0.398 0.385 0.334 0.354
Number of jobs 0.92 1.05 1.10 1.07
Multiple jobs 0.049 0.070 0.110 0.087
Average monthly wage Aug’13 8,052 10,816 16,292 13,203
Number of workers 9,936,088 1,413,204 881,104 357,775
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for private and public registered wage earners in Ar-
gentina in the year 2013. The three groups in columns (2)-(4) are defined based on the highest gross
monthly wage between January and August 2013 (the running variable in the RD analysis). Column (1)
corresponds to the universe of wage earners. Table entries are means unless otherwise noted. Monetary
values are in Argentine pesos.
Table 4: Density test at potential reference points
Density test at:
AR$ 10,000 AR$ 15,000 AR$ 20,000
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
p-value removing spike 0.2833 0.8105 0.8520
Notes: This table shows the p-values of the RD manipulation test based on discontinuity in density
using a local polynomial (Cattaneo et al., 2018). The null hypothesis is that there is no manipulation of
the density at the cutoff. We run the test at the income tax discontinuity of 15k and at two other reference
points unrelated to the income tax, 10k and 20k. We report the p-value including and excluding the
mass (spike) at each threshold.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: reduced-form
% ∆y 0.41∗∗ 4.27∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 7.86∗∗∗
(0.19) (1.14) (0.805) (0.985)
Panel B: first-stage
% ∆[1− τ] 24.7∗∗∗ 23.1∗∗∗ 24.6∗∗∗ 25.2∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.14) (0.28)
Panel C: (A)/(B)
Elasticity e 0.017∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.049) (0.033) (0.041)
Observations 466,721 200,939 53,637 7,802
Notes: This tables reports point estimates and standard errors for the year 2015. Panel A shows the
reduced-form percentage change in labor supply measures around the discontinuity, panel B shows the
percentage change in the net of marginal tax rates, and panel C presents the elasticity which essentially
scales the reduced-form effect by its first stage. The elasticity, e = %∆y/%∆[1− τ], is computed using a
two-stage fuzzy RD procedure at 15k. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Dependent variables are
annual earnings growth relative to 2013 (columns 1, 3, and 4) and difference in overtime hours relative
to 2013 (column 2). For overtime hours, we scale the reduced-form change in labor supply (1.12 hours
per month) by average overtime hours around 15k (26.3 hours per month) and apply the Delta Method
to get the standard errors. For the change in the net-of-tax-rate, we adopt a conservative approach and
use individual-level marginal tax rates in August 2013 (pre) and December 2013 (post). Using marginal
tax rates in 2015 could potentially capture behavioral responses of workers with incomes above the
threshold because bracket creep makes them face higher taxes during the period of analysis. In any
case, using marginal tax rates in 2015 would make the first stage even larger and the elasticity even
smaller. The last row denotes the effective number of observations that participate in each regression.
RD estimates are computed with the rdrobust routine from Calonico et al. (2017). ∗∗∗ significant at 1%,
∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗ significant at 10%.
57
A Additional Figures and Tables








































Reference Period: Jan-Aug’13 Earnings fully untaxed if eligible (2.5 years)
Notes: This figure displays the chronology of the events. The tax break was announced on August 28th,
2013, and entered into force on September 1st, 2013. On August 29th, the Argentine IRS issued a memo
(RG 3525/2013) explaining in detail who was affected and how to compute the threshold. On May 5th
2015, the IRS reconfirmed the tax cut with another memo (RG 3770/2015). The policy was repealed on
February 22nd, 2016 by the new administration that took office in December 2015. The beginning and
end of the tax holiday were unanticipated and thus created income effects. The policy was perceived
as a temporary fix to a deteriorated income tax schedule where inflation was high and tax parameters
were not indexed. The tax cut was expected to be in place at least until the end of 2015 when Argentina
held presidential elections.


















Notes: This figure summarizes the two eligibility rules that determine whether a wage earner qualifies
for the tax holiday. The first row corresponds to workers with wage employment history between Jan-
uary and August 2013. These incumbent workers were tax-exempt if their highest monthly wage between
January and August 2013 was less than or equal to AR$ 15,000. The second row corresponds to work-
ers without wage employment history between January and August 2013 who entered the labor force
thereafter. These new entrants were tax-exempt if their first monthly wage was less than or equal to AR$
15,000. In both cases, workers with incomes above the threshold continued to pay taxes normally. Thus,
for the first group, the rule was based on past wage earnings; and for the second group, the rule was
based on the wage paid in the first month of employment. That is, in both cases, workers did not lose
the benefit if subsequent monthly wages exceeded AR$ 15,000 after August 2013. The tax exemption
applied to their entire salary (i.e., zero marginal and average tax rates). The tax break only applied to
wage earners. Independent workers are taxed under a different regime and did not benefit from the
policy change. Using the exchange rate from August 2013, AR$ 15k correspond to USD 3k.
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Figure A2: Stylized Facts in Argentina 2000-2016






















































Inflation RIPTE (avg. salary) Exchange Rate
















































Notes: Panel (a) displays the annual inflation rate from The Billion Prices Project at MIT (Cavallo and
Bertolotto, 2016), the average salary of registered workers (RIPTE, Remuneraciones Imponibles Prome-
dio de los Trabajadores Estables) from the Ministry of Labor, and the exchange peso-dollar rate from
the Central Bank. Panel (b) shows GDP growth from WDI-World Bank as a proxy for the business cycle.
After some years of persistent growth, excluding the U.S. recession, the economy started to cool down
during the period of analysis 2011-2017 as GDP growth oscillates around zero.
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Withheld Salaried Workers / Registered Salaried Workers (%)
(d) Wage earners subject to the income tax (%)
Notes: Panel (a) presents the income tax schedule and illustrates how inflation reduced the significance
of taxable thresholds. Panel (b) shows the fraction of taxpayers in each tax bracket and illustrates the
“bracket creep” phenomenon: in the early 2000s the first bracket had the highest frequency and by 2016
the top bracket became the most common. Panel (c) shows the evolution of personal exemptions for a
married worker with two children (gray bar), average nominal earnings for registered workers (black
bar), and the ratio between both variables (red line). Panel (d) reports the share of wage earners affected
by the income tax. Source: taken from Tortarolo (2018).
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Figure A4: Pay scale for wage earners in the banking sector
Notes: This figure shows the pay scale negotiated by the labor union representing wage earners in the
banking sector (bancarios) in the year 2015. The table shows the base salary that every bank has to pay to
their employees depending on one’s seniority and hierarchy in the company (e.g., administrator with
1-35 years of tenure, chief of division, main chief, submanagers, etc.). This sector is highly affected by
the income tax and workers in this sector always participate in mass strikes to complain about it.
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Figure A5: Pay scale for city bus drivers
Notes: This figure shows the pay scale negotiated by the labor union UTA representing city bus drivers
(colectiveros de corta y media distancia) in the year 2013. The table shows different pay components (in
columns) that vary by years of tenure from 0 to 30 (in rows): base salary in column 1, additional pay
per year of tenure in column 2, a bonus for low absenteeism in column 3, overtime pay premiums in
columns 4 and 5, and total monthly wage in column 6.
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Figure A6: SSC filing software (Aplicativo SICOSS)
Notes: This figure provides a snapshot of the personnel management software used by employers to
report the monthly wage earnings of every worker on their payroll and to pay the associated social
security contributions. This simple interface is the source of the core data used in the paper. The
figure contains two panels. The bottom panel is the one where employers report earnings and some
compensation subcomponents. Sueldo contains monthly wage earnings. Adicionales contains payments
based on other factors such as low absenteeism, college degree, seniority. Premios contains bonuses
(productivity, commissions). Importe Horas extras contains monthly overtime pay. SAC contains the
13th salary. Vacaciones contains paid vacation supplement. Plus zona desfavorable contains a payment
for people living in the south of the country. Nro de Horas extra trabajadas contains monthly overtime
hours. Conceptos no remunerativos contains non-contributory payments negotiated by labor unions that
are exempt from payroll taxes.
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Figure A7: Fraction of wage earners subject to the income tax
(a) Single workers without children















10,000 11,000 12,000 13,000 14,000 15,000 16,000 17,000 18,000 19,000 20,000
Max[earnings | Jan-Aug 2013]
2013 Aug (before) 
2013 Sep (after)
(b) Married workers with two children















10,000 11,000 12,000 13,000 14,000 15,000 16,000 17,000 18,000 19,000 20,000
Max[earnings | Jan-Aug 2013]
2013 Aug (before) 
2013 Sep (after)
Notes: This figure plots the fraction of salaried workers subject to the income tax before and after
the reform against the the running variable in the RDD for single workers without children (panel a)
and married workers with two children (panel b). The vertical dashed line denotes the discontinuity
introduced by the reform at AR$ 15,000. In both panels, the bin width is AR$ 500.
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Figure A8: First-stage change in MTR and ATR - Single workers without children







































































Notes: These figures plot marginal and average tax rates before, during, and after the tax holiday. The
rates are computed for a single worker without children assuming that she earns a constant monthly
wage in the first eight months of 2013. Since the running variable takes the highest monthly wage, the
numbers from this figure constitute an upper bound for the empirical first stage. Taxable income is
computed by subtracting payroll taxes of τpayroll = 17% and personal exemptions of AR$ 8,360 from
gross wage earnings. Personal exemptions for married workers with two children are AR$ 11,563 and
therefore the change in tax rates would look smaller. The MTRs and tax liability are calculated using
the schedule from Table 1.
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10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000
Max[earnings | Jan-Aug 2013]
Average by bin
95% C.I.
(d) Fraction with children
Notes: These figures show demographic characteristics of the sample around the discontinuity as of
August 2013 by bins of the running variable (width AR$ 250). Panel (a) displays the average age of
wage earners, panel (b) displays the fraction of male workers, panel (c) displays the fraction of married
workers, and panel (d) displays the fraction of wage earners with children. RD estimates are reported
in each graph using a triangular kernel, linear fit, and bandwidth of AR$ 3,000. We use the rdrobust
routine from Calonico et al. (2017). The four panels show that there is no systematic difference in
observable variables between wage earners just above and just below the cutoff, a requirement for the
RDD to be valid.
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12/31/2012 12/31/2013 12/31/2014 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/01/2017
weeks
"Impuesto a las Ganancias" "Minimo no Imponible"
"Pizzeria" "Parrilla"
Data source: Google Trends (www.google.com/trends)
Notes: This figure displays Google Trends queries for income-tax related terms in Argentina during
2012-2017: impuesto a las ganancias (income tax) and minimo no imponible (non-taxable income floor). It
also shows vertical markers for policy events and two other popular searches as a benchmark: parrillas
(steak restaurant) and pizzeria (pizza restaurant). The numbers represent the popularity of each term in
Argentina, during this period of time, relative to the highest point on the chart (parrillas in December
2014). A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular as the peak. The first red spike corresponds
to March 2013 when the government updated the annual value of personal exemptions after 2 years
with no adjustments, the second red spike coincides with the announcement of the tax holiday, the
third and fourth red spikes correspond to a mass national strike organized by labor unions that were
partially benefitted by the holiday, the fifth red spike coincides with the repeal of the holiday, and the
last red spike coincides with a comprehensive reform of the income tax (a new law passed in Congress).
The figure shows that people actively searched for key words related to the income tax on the internet
around the time the reform was passed, updated, and repealed. Although the search frequency for
income tax terms is lower than the frequency for more popular terms like parrillas and pizzeria, the red
line displays sharp spikes exactly at the key dates.
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Figure A11: The reform covered by centre-right newspapers
  |  Miércoles 28 de agosto de 2013  POLÍTICA | 5
Anuncian que no pagarán Ganancias los 
salarios inferiores a los 15.000 pesos
El Gobierno busca una mejora del clima social de cara a las elecciones de octubre; entre los 15.000 y los 25.000 pesos habrá 
una reducción del 20 por ciento; también subirán las asignaciones familiares; se crea un impuesto para títulos y dividendos
En la segunda reunión de la mesa del 
diálogo social, la presidenta Cristina 
Kirchner anunció ayer que firmó un 
decreto por el cual dispuso una sen-
sible rebaja en el impuesto a las ga-
nancias para jubilados y trabajado-
res en relación de dependencia: sólo 
pagarán desde el 1° de septiembre los 
que perciban salarios brutos a partir 
de $ 15.000, casados y solteros por 
igual, y se aumentarán en un 20% 
las deducciones de quienes perciban 
entre $ 15.000 y $ 25.000. 
Para financiarla, la mandataria 
adelantó en la Casa Rosada que se 
crearán dos nuevos impuestos, para 
lo cual enviará hoy un proyecto de 
ley a la Cámara de Diputados: uno a 
la compraventa de acciones que no 
cotizan en Bolsa y otro al reparto de 
dividendos de las empresas. 
Además, la Anses aumentó en 
850.000 chicos el universo que per-
cibirá la asignación familiar por hijo 
y aumentó los montos. La primera 
reunión con empresarios y sindi-
calistas, donde se abordaron estos 
temas, había sido en Río Gallegos el 
miércoles último. Tras los anuncios, 
ayer Cristina y sus visitantes delibe-
raron dos horas y media más sobre 
competitividad, economías regiona-
les, precios y presión tributaria.
Con estas medidas redistributi-
vas, la mandataria buscará reto-
mar el control de la agenda pública 
y revertir en las elecciones legisla-
tivas del 27 de octubre próximo la 
dura derrota en las primarias del 11 
de agosto último. La baja de Ganan-
cias era un reclamo de todas las cen-
trales sindicales y de la mayoría de 
la oposición, y había sido uno de los 
reclamos centrales de los cacerola-
zos del último año.
El titular de la AFIP, Ricardo Eche-
garay, explicó que el impacto fiscal 
será de 4495 millones de pesos en 
2013 y que dejarán así de pagar ga-
nancias 1.497.368 trabajadores, ac-
tivos y pasivos. Es parte de la clase 
media que el Frente para la Victoria 
quiere reconquistar, explicaron ayer 
a la nacion altas fuentes oficiales.  
Tras una breve presentación de 
Cristina Kirchner ante unos 30 em-
presarios y sindicalistas en el Salón 
de las Mujeres de la Casa Rosada, 
Echegaray informó que el piso sa-
larial a partir del cual jubilados y 
trabajadores de la cuarta categoría 
pagarán Ganancias pasará a ser de 
15.000 pesos desde el 1° de septiem-
bre y regirá por igual para los solte-
ros y casados con hijos.
Hasta hoy ese mínimo es de 8360 
pesos (solteros) y 11.563 (casados). 
“Hemos eliminado la distinción 
entre casados y solteros”, celebró 
la mandataria. “Éste es un gran be-
neficio para los trabajadores”, dijo 
el titular de la CTA oficialista, Hugo 
Yasky, al salir del encuentro.
Esta decisión se adoptará por de-
creto y se publicará hoy en el Bole-
tín Oficial. Además quienes ganen 
entre 15.000 y 25.000 pesos podrán 
aumentar en un 20% las deduccio-
nes del impuesto a las ganancias, lo 
cual mejora en los hechos el salario 
de bolsillo. 
Para los empleados y jubilados 
de la región patagónica (La Pampa, 
Neuquén, Río Negro, Chubut, Santa 
Cruz, y Carmen de Patagones, pro-
vincia de Buenos Aires), el incre-
mento del mínimo no imponible 
será del 30%. 
Para financiar el impacto fiscal de 
4495 millones de pesos, el Gobierno 
enviará hoy un proyecto de ley a Di-
putados para crear dos nuevos im-
puestos que buscan recaudar 2056 
millones de pesos. 
Uno gravará con una alícuota del 
15% a la compraventa de acciones y 
títulos que no cotizan en la Bolsa y 
se eliminará la exención que tienen 
los sujetos del exterior por la com-
praventa de acciones (recaudaría 
697 millones de pesos anuales); otro 
tributo gravará con una tasa de 10% 
al reparto de dividendos de las em-
presas entre sus accionistas (1359 mi-
llones). Éste será el aporte del sector 
privado, que pidió la Presidenta en la 
reunión de Río Gallegos. Así se im-
puso el criterio del titular de Adeba, 
Jorge Brito, que el miércoles reclamó 
no afectar a todas las acciones. 
En tanto, el Estado aportará 2439 
millones de pesos. Según señalaron 
a la nacion fuentes de la AFIP esos 
recursos saldrán del “esfuerzo fiscal, 
de la recaudación”.
“Con el nuevo esquema, sólo pa-
garán Ganancias el 10,2% del total 
de los empleados y el 0,7% de los ju-
bilados y pensionados”, dijo Eche-
garay. 
Además, la Presidenta le dio la pa-
labra al administrador de la Anses, 
Diego Bossio, que anunció el aumen-
to del tope salarial en las asignacio-
nes familiares por hijo, con lo cual se 
incrementa el universo de asalaria-
Mariano Obarrio
LA NACION
del editor: qué significa. El 
Gobierno demostró que está 
dispuesto a jugar todas sus 
cartas para revertir la derrota 
electoral. Ayer hizo su mayor 
apuesta con un costo alto
Cristina y su equipo económico hizo el anuncio en la segunda jornada de diálogo social con empresarios y sindicalistas presidencia
cambios impositivos  |  Un reclamo generalizado
polÍtica
Edición de hoy a cargo de Jorge Liotti  |  www.lanacion.com/politica   @politica_LN     Facebook.com/lanacion     LNpolitica@lanacion.com.ar
dos que las percibirá (ver página 7).  
Además de Bossio y Echegaray 
estuvieron Hernán Lorenzino, Dé-
bora Giorgi, Julio De Vido, Carlos 
Tomada, Carlos Zannini, Mercedes 
Marcó del Pont, Axel Kicillof, Gui-
llermo Moreno y Beatriz Paglieri. 
Por los empresarios concurrieron 
Brito, Héctor Méndez (industria), 
Gustavo Weiss (construcción), 
Eduardo Eurnekian (comercio), 
Daniel Funes de Rioja (alimentos), 
Juan Carlos Fábrega (Abappra, 
bancos públicos), Enrique Cristofa-
ni (ABA, bancos privados), Osvaldo 
Cornide (CAME), Ider Peretti (CGE), 
Marcelo Fernández (Cgera) y Juan 
Carlos Lascurain (Adimra). Por el 
sindicalismo, estuvieron Yasky; el 
secretario general de la CGT, An-
tonio Caló, y otros integrantes de la 
mesa directiva. El clima fue cordial, 
se convino conformar comisiones 
para abordar temas de competitivi-
dad, precios, y la presión tributaria, 
nacional, provincial y municipal. La 
mandataria se comprometió a con-
vocar para esto último a intendentes 
y gobernadores.ß 
Las novedades más importantes
El Gobierno comunicó ayer una batería de medidas
El mínimo de Ganancias
Fue la medida más relevante  
porque se había transforma-
do en la demanda principal 
de los gremios y la oposición. 
A partir del 1° de septiembre 
no pagarán el impuesto los 
asalariados (y jubilados) en 
relación de dependencia que 
cobren hasta $ 15.000 men-
suales, ya sean solteros o ca-
sados con hijos
Ganancias por 
encima de $ 15.000
Quienes perciben entre $ 
15.000 y $ 25.000 tendrán 
una reducción del gravamen 
del 20 por ciento. Para los 
trabajadores patagónicos el 
beneficio alcanzará al 30 por 
ciento
Sin mecanismo de 
actualización
La principal crítica que le 
hace la oposición es que no 
se estableció un mecanismo 
de actualización de los mon-
tos, por lo que con el avance 
de la inflación el beneficio 
otorgado se licuará y reque-
rirá una nueva medida
Asignaciones familiares
Vinculado a la baja de 
Ganancias, el Gobierno 
anunció modificaciones en 
las asignaciones familiares, 
que tendrán una suba del 
78,5 por ciento
Los montos de las 
asignaciones
Para los sueldos de hasta $ 
4800 cobrarán 460 pesos; de 
4800 a 6000, recibirán $ 320 
por hijo; entre 6000 y 7000 
pesos, 200 pesos, y de 7801 a 
30.000, $ 110. Para cobrar la 
asignación, el sueldo de cada 
uno de los integrantes del 
grupo familiar no deberá su-
perar los $ 15.000
Los nuevos impuestos
Para compensar el costo fis-
cal de los cambios en Ganan-
cias y asignaciones, que el 
Gobierno calcula en $ 4495 
millones, se anunció un im-
puesto del 15 por ciento a la 
compra y la venta de accio-
nes que no cotizan en el mer-
cado de capitales y del 10 por 




con el nuevo 
réGimen
Cómo impactará 
en el bolsillo de los 
trabajadores las 
modificaciones en el 
cobro del impuesto a las 
ganancias y cuál será el 
universo afectado
Como un “milagro b^b^^
del papa Francisco” inter-
pretaron los conductores 
del programa “Palabras 
más, palabras menos” la 
visita del titular de la AFIP, 
Ricardo Echegaray, al ca-
nal TN, del Grupo Clarín, 
para explicar cómo se apli-
carán los cambios  del im-
puesto a las Ganancias. 
“Es un paso adelante b^b^^
y no una marcha atrás”, 
justificó el funcionario, al 
negar que el cambio im-
pacte negativamente en el 
financiamiento de los pla-
nes para los más necesita-
dos. “Categóricamente no”, 
respondió Echegaray, 
cuando se le preguntó si 
después de las elecciones 
aumentará el recargo del 
20% que cobra la AFIP por 
los gastos en el exterior. 
Echegaray fue  
a TN y explicó 
las medidas
TOPE DEL MONTO MÍNIMO NO IMPONIBLE CAMBIO DE DEDUCCIONES LOS QUE PAGARÁN Y LOS QUE NO
Empleados
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El monto mínimo para trabajadores con sueldo 
bruto de entre $ 15.000 y 25.000, aumentará 20%
En la región patagónica
El monto mínimo para trabajadores con 












(a) August 28th, 2013
30/10/2016 Clarín ­ Esta es la tapa del día en que naciste
http://tapas.clarin.com/tapa.html#20130828 1/1
AD | 6 seconds remaining
(b) August 28th, 2013
(c) July 22nd, 2014 (d) April 1st, 2015
Notes: These images show the impact that the income tax change had in the main newspapers of
Argentina. Panels (a) and (c) correspond to Diario La Nación and panels (b) and (d) to Diario Clarín. Panel
(a) reads: “The government announced that monthly wage earnings lower than AR$ 15,000 are exempt
from the income tax”; panel (b) reads: “Only workers earning more than AR$ 15,000 will be subject to
the income tax”; panel (c) reads: “Income tax: decree 1242 created unequal treatment of wage earners”;
panel (d) reads: “The national mass strike against the income tax had a strong impact”. Panels (a) and
(b) correspond to the day the tax holiday was announced, and panels (c) and (d) correspond to two dates
in the middle of the tax holiday. See also Diario La Nación (http://servicios.lanacion.com.ar/
archivo/2013/08/28/005/DT) and Diario Clarín (http://tapas.clarin.com/tapa.html#20130828).
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Figure A11 (cont.): The reform covered by centre-left newspapers
(e) August 28th, 2013 (f) August 31st, 2013
Notes: These images show the impact that the income tax change had in the main centre-left newspaper
of Argentina, Diario Página|12. Panel (e) reads: “Up to AR$ 15,000 you don’t pay,” and explains that
the announcement made by the President takes effect immediately starting on September 1st 2013; the
front page from panel (f) says that the government and the Argentine IRS issued a memo explaining
in detail who is benefited and who is not, and the way to compute the assignment variable used in the
RDD.
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Figure A12: Fraction of wage earners that remain employed
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RD estimate
95% C.I.
Notes: This figure plots the fraction of wage earners that remain employed by bins of the running vari-
able (panel a) and the evolution of the RD estimates (panel b). The dependent variable is an indicator
for whether the worker has positive wage earnings by December of each year. Averages are computed
for 10 equally-spaced bins of AR$ 500 on each side. In panel (a), we use blue dots to denote the years
(December) during which the tax holiday was in place. The figure captures an extensive margin re-
sponses and shows that workers did not drop out of the labor force differentially above and below the
discontinuity.
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RD estimate
95% C.I.
Notes: This graph plots the evolution of the RD estimates for base salary and residual compensation as
a share of total compensation. Each dot corresponds to a separate RD regression using a linear fit on
each side of the discontinuity, a triangular kernel, and a AR$3,000 bandwidth. The dependent variable
in the RD is the percentage of total salary accounted for by base salary (panel a) and the percentage
accounted for by residual compensation (panel b), both relative to their share in 2013. The residual
is computed as the difference between total wage earnings and base salary. The vertical dashed lines
indicate the beginning and the end of the tax holiday.
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Figure A14: Descriptive statistics for overtime work
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Notes: These figures show time series of three overtime outcomes for the universe of wage earners in
Argentina during the period 2003-2017. Panel (a) reports the fraction of individuals working overtime
(blue line) and the share of total wage earnings accounted for by overtime pay (red line). Panel (b) shows
average overtime hours per month. Overtime hours began to be reported in the data in 2007. About 17%
of wage earners work overtime, which accounts for 13% of total wage earnings. Conditional on working
overtime, average monthly hours are 25. Source: authors’ calculation based on SIPA microdata.
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Figure A15: RD estimates for executives and managers
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RD estimate
95% C.I.
Notes: This figure plots wage earnings growth by bins of the running variable (panel a) and the evo-
lution of the RD estimates (panel b) for executives paid as wage earners in the period 2011-2017. The
dependent variable in the RD is annual earnings growth relative to 2013. The averages in panel (a) are
computed for 10 equally-spaced bins of AR$ 1,000. Each dot from panel (b) corresponds to a separate
standard RD regression using a linear fit on each side of the discontinuity, a triangular kernel, and a
AR$4,000 bandwidth. The point estimate thus measures the excess earnings growth between managers
below and above the discontinuity. The vertical dashed lines indicate the beginning and the end of the
reform.
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
enter at 15k
enter at 20k or 25k
enter at 10k
Notes: This graph plots the number of wage earners entering the labor market with income exactly at
10k (yellow line), 15k (red line), and 20k or 25k (green line) for three years pre-reform, two years during
the reform, and two years post-repeal. We first count the number of wage earners entering exactly at a
focal point in each month and then compute the monthly average for different years. The mass at 10k
and 15k qualifies for the tax holiday, and the mass at 20k and 25k does not qualify. The vertical dashed
lines indicate the beginning and the end of the tax holiday.
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Figure A17: Entrance at focal points: executives vs other entrants
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Executives
Rest of entrants
(b) Entering at 20k or 25k (tax zone)
Pre-reform Reform Post-repeal



















2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Executives
Rest of entrants
Notes: This figure shows counts of wage earners entering at focal points broken down by executive
workers (red line) versus other entrants (dashed blue line). Panel (a) corresponds to entry at 15k (tax
exempt during the reform years) and panel (b) corresponds to entry at 20k or 25k (tax liable). The
vertical dashed lines indicate the beginning and the end of the tax holiday. For more details, see Figure
A16.
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RD estimate
95% C.I.
Notes: This graph plots the time series of RD estimates computed as in Figure 6. The vertical blue
lines indicate the beginning of the reform, August 2013, and the date it was repealed, February 2016.
Each dot corresponds to a separate regression. The dependent variable is the hourly wage. We use the
sample of overtime workers for whom we observe monthly hours, and compute the hourly wage from
the ratio of overtime pay to overtime hours. The precise zero effect from this figure shows that the null
aggregate elasticity is not attributable to an incidence story whereby individuals work longer hours but
employers reduce their wage rate.
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(d) RD Age: 51+
Notes: This graph plots the time series of RD estimates computed as in Figure 6. Panel (a) corresponds
to workers ages 18-30; Panel (b) corresponds to workers ages 31-40; Panel (c) corresponds to workers
ages 41-50; Panel (d) corresponds to workers older than 50. The vertical dashed lines indicate the begin-
ning of the tax holiday, August 2013, and the date it was repealed, February 2016. Each dot corresponds
to a separate regression. The RD estimates are computed by comparing annual wage earnings growth
relative to 2013 for workers with a running variable slightly below and above AR$ 15,000 (i.e., the excess
earnings growth at the threshold).
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Figure A20: Labor market rigidities across the globe
(a) Employer-employee cooperation
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Cooperation in labor-employer relations
Q: In your country, how do you characterize labor-employer relations?














































(b) Flexibility of wage determination
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Flexibility of wage determination
Q: In your country, how are wages generally set?














































Notes: This figure presents measures of labor market rigidity using comparable data from 45 countries
(OECD and South America). The statistics come from an Executive Opinion Survey of a representa-
tive sample of business leaders in their respective countries (In 2014: 14,000 leaders in 148 economies;
Median = 87 overall, 122 in Argentina). Source: World Economic Forum, the Global Competitiveness
Index Dataset 2013-2014.
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Figure A21: Labor market rigidities across the globe
(c) Flexible hiring and firing
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Ease of hiring and firing practices
Q: In your country, to what extent do regulations allow for the flexible hiring and firing of workers?














































(d) Taxation and disincentives to work
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Effect of taxation on incentives to work
Q: In your country, to what extent do taxes and SSC reduce the incentive to work?














































Notes: This figure presents measures of labor market rigidity using comparable data from 45 countries
(OECD and South America). The statistics come from an Executive Opinion Survey of a representa-
tive sample of business leaders in their respective countries (In 2014: 14,000 leaders in 148 economies;
Median = 87 overall, 122 in Argentina). Source: World Economic Forum, the Global Competitiveness
Index Dataset 2013-2014.
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B The quality of the running variable
The identification of causal effects in RDDs is potentially undermined by measurement
error in the assignment variable. In this section, we take this threat very seriously and
acknowledge that our assignment could, in principle, suffer from non-classical mea-
surement error to the left of the discontinuity, but we argue that, in practice, it ought
to be a small issue. To that end, we first formalize the argument and then present gran-
ular evidence from two anonymous firms that suggests that attenuation bias appears
small and does not pose a threat to our empirical findings.57
Recall that the running variable is given by the highest gross monthly wage ac-
crued in the first eight months of 2013. The day after the decree was passed, the Argen-
tine IRS issued a circular (RG 3525/2013) clarifying how employers should compute
this variable. In particular, it stated that accountants should only consider monthly,
normal, and habitual compensation components paid out in at least 6 months of the
8-month reference period. This implied that employers had to exclude unusual one-
time payments such as the 13th salary paid in June, annual bonuses, paid vacation
benefits, non-regular overtime pay or commissions, etc.
Although firms and accountants are familiar with the definition of the running vari-
able (e.g., it is the same earnings base used to calculate severance payments), there
could be some ambiguous cases where our judgement of “unusual payments” differs
from the (unobserved) decision taken by the firm. In particular, the monthly frequency
and detail of our data allow us to be very cautious and to subtract any unusual pay-
ment from the running variable. Thus, it could happen that a firm places a worker
to the right of the discontinuity if the accountant misses an unusual payment when
computing the assignment variable (e.g., the firm includes an annual bonus paid in
May that we exclude). Hence, we argue that our measured running variable is lower
than or equal to the true running variable, meaning that some workers could be mis-
placed to the left of the discontinuity (i.e., the error is not symmetric) introducing some
fuzziness to our design.58
B.1 Non-classical measurement error in the assignment variable
We formalize this potential issue by adapting the framework developed by Battistin
et al. (2009). Using the potential outcomes framework, the outcome of interest can be
written as:
Y = Y0 + T(Wmax)β (B.1)
where Y0 is the outcome absent the reform, Wmax ≡ max{Monthly Salary|Jan-Aug’13}
is the true running variable, T = 1 if Wmax > 15k so that the worker keeps paying the
income tax normally, T = 0 if Wmax ≤ 15k so that the worker becomes tax exempt, and
β = Y1−Y0 is the causal effect (the change in earnings corresponding to a change in the
57We are very grateful to Zhuan Pei for helpful feedback on this section.
58Nonetheless, the richness of our data allow us to be “good accountants” and minimize this source of
error. Moreover, the data we use are in fact reported by accountants themselves to the IRS based on
workers’ payslips.
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income tax). Hence, our RDD is sharp by design. We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: E[Y0|Wmax] is a continuous function of Wmax at c̄ = 15k. That is, in the
absence of the policy no discontinuity would be observed in outcome Y around 15k.
Assumption 2: Our measured assignment variable exhibits non-classical measurement
error with the following form:
Ŵmax = Wmax · Z + W̃max · (1− Z), with W̃max < Wmax (B.2)
ε = Ŵmax −Wmax = (W̃max −Wmax) · (1− Z) ≤ 0 (B.3)
where Ŵmax is our measured running variable, Wmax is the variable calculated by em-
ployers, and Z is an indicator for exact matches that we assume is iid. So our measure
Ŵmax captures a mixture of accountants constructing the running variable exactly as
we do and accountants doing it slightly differently (e.g., by not excluding unusual
one-time payments from the running variable).59 Note that measurement error ε is
non-classical because it depends on the true running variable Wmax (while under clas-
sical measurement error, ε is assumed to be independent of Wmax).60
This formulation says that, regardless of the value of Wmax, there is some probability
that our measured running variable is smaller than the true (unobserved) one, i.e. there
is some probability that the firm misses some unusual payments that the econometri-
cian properly excludes. As a result, the misclassification of T(Wmax) is only one-sided,
meaning that to the left of the cutoff there are some people for whom we get it right
and some other people for whom we get it wrong. While to the right of the cutoff,
workers are not misclassified. Empirically, the relevant question is whether the frac-
tion Pr[Z = 1|Ŵmax = c̄−] is large or small.
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1, E[Y0|Ŵmax] is a continuous function of Ŵmax at
c̄ = 15k.
Proof. Noting from (B.3) that Ŵmax = Wmax + ε, we can write:
E[Y0|Ŵmax = w] = E[Y0|Wmax + ε = w] =
∫
E[Y0|Wmax = w− ε, ε] · dF(ε|w)
=
∫
E[Y0|Wmax = w− ε] · dF(ε)
where the second equality follows from the LIE and the third equality follows from
the standard independence assumption that measurement error does not affect Y di-
rectly. Then, since E[Y0|Wmax] is continuous, integrating over different values of ε is
also continuous.
Using equation (B.1), Assumption 1, Assumption 2, and Proposition 1, we can write
59The nature of our measurement error is related to the treatment given by Card et al. (2015) for the
fuzzy RKD case. This is also known as the contaminated sampling model (Horowitz and Manski, 1995).
60The fact that our assignment variable does not suffer from classical measurement error is critical, as
Pei and Shen (2016) show that under classical measurement error (i.e., mean-zero white noise), even
if E[T|Wmax] were discontinuous at c̄, such discontinuity would be smoothed out by the measurement
error and, as a result, E[T|Ŵmax] would be smooth at c̄, preventing identification of the causal effect
at the discontinuity.
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the difference in mean outcomes for workers slightly above and below c̄ = 15k as:
E[Y|Ŵmax = c̄+]− E[Y|Ŵmax = c̄−] = E[Y0|Ŵmax = c̄+]− E[Y0|Ŵmax = c̄−] (B.4)
+ E[T(Wmax)β|Ŵmax = c̄+]− E[T(Wmax)β|Ŵmax = c̄−]
The first two terms on the RHS cancel out by Proposition 1. From Assumption 2, we
have that Pr[T = 1|Ŵmax = c̄+] = 1. Then, using the LIE, the RHS of equation (B.4)
can be written as:
E[T(Wmax)β|Ŵmax = c̄+] = E[1β|T = 1, Ŵmax = c̄+] · Pr[T = 1|Ŵmax = c̄+](B.5)
+ E[0β|T = 0, Ŵmax = c̄+] · Pr[T = 0|Ŵmax = c̄+]
= β
E[T(Wmax)β|Ŵmax = c̄−] = E[1β|T = 1, Ŵmax = c̄−] · Pr[T = 1|Ŵmax = c̄−]
+ E[0β|T = 0, Ŵmax = c̄−] · Pr[T = 0|Ŵmax = c̄−]
= β · Pr[T = 1|Ŵmax = c̄−]
Hence, expression (B.4) simplifies to:
E[Y|Ŵmax = c̄+]− E[Y|Ŵmax = c̄−] = β · (1− Pr[T = 1|Ŵmax = c̄−]) (B.6)
Rearranging yields:
β =
E[Y|Ŵmax = c̄+]− E[Y|Ŵmax = c̄−]
Pr[T = 0|Ŵmax = c̄−]
(B.7)
Hence, equation (B.7) suggests that, by estimating the numerator, there is a potential
attenuation bias due to the form of our measurement error. Two points are worth
noting. First, the only way to get sharp compliance where Pr[T = 0|Ŵmax = c̄−] =
1 is by requesting monthly payroll data from every firm, in which case we would
observe the true running variable Ŵmax = Wmax. Second, if we had data from the IRS
of withheld and non-withheld workers after the reform we would be able to compute
Pr[T = 0|Ŵmax = c̄−], allowing us to scale the reduced-form estimate. Unfortunately,
the administrative data at hand only allow us to estimate the numerator and, therefore,
if Pr[T = 0|Ŵmax = c̄−] < 1, we identify an attenuated version of the true causal effect:
β× Pr[T = 0|c̄−].
B.2 Discussion
The previous formal derivation suggests that the discontinuity in the probability of
paying taxes observed around the cutoff understates the true sharp jump from 0 to 1
by a factor of Pr[T = 0|Ŵmax = c̄−]. Intuitively, this is the fraction of workers below
the threshold that are not misclassified. This is illustrated in Figure A22 where we
simulate the consequences of having non-classical vs classical measurement error in
the running variable.
To estimate this bias term we would need to know whether or not workers have
taxes withheld after the policy change, which is infeasible due to tax data limitations.
Nonetheless, we argue that, in practice, this issue ought to be small or, in other words,
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that Pr[Z = 1|Ŵmax = c̄−] is likely close to 1 for two reasons. First, our running vari-
able is carefully constructed using monthly data from SICOSS reported by the same
accountants who file income tax withholdings through SICORE.61 Moreover, earnings
are reported with some detail, allowing us to net out unusual payments such as the
13th salary paid in June, annual bonuses, etc. Second, the results from our case study
in which we observe the true running variable reassuringly show that, at least for these
two firms, we are getting the measure 100% right.
The administrative data at hand only allow us to estimate the numerator and, there-
fore, if Pr[T = 0|c̄−] < 1, we are identifying an attenuated version of the true causal
effect: β× Pr[T = 0|c̄−]. For example, with an estimated reduced-form estimate of 0.02
and Pr[T = 0|c̄−] = 0.5 we would get β = 0.04, which is still a tiny effect. Conversely,
how problematic does measurement error have to be to get to higher values reported
in some studies? For example, assuming β = 0.5 and three different reduced-form
estimates (1%, 5%, and 10%) we get:
• 0.5 = 0.01/Pr(.) ⇒ Pr(T = 0|c̄−) = 2%
• 0.5 = 0.05/Pr(.) ⇒ Pr(T = 0|c̄−) = 10%
• 0.5 = 0.10/Pr(.) ⇒ Pr(T = 0|c̄−) = 20%
Thus, we would need to get the assignment below 15k correct for only 2%, 10%,
and 20% of the workers. Our careful construction of the running variable, the two
case studies, and anecdotal evidence from accountants suggest that these low values
are highly unrealistic. Thus, without loss of generality, it is safe to ignore this source
of attenuation bias since it will not change the conclusions of the empirical analysis.
B.3 Empirical evidence from two firms
In this subsection, we present evidence from two anonymous firms for which we ob-
serve the true running variable and income tax concepts. By comparing their assign-
ment relative to our own-derived measure, we confirm that, in practice, the attenuation
bias derived from non-classical measurement error in the running variable is a second-
order issue.62
The confidential information was provided by two employers in the form of monthly
payslips that we digitized with a Python script and which were then merged with the
SSA administrative data.63 These granular data contain every positive and negative
pay component reported in workers’ payslips (including income tax withholding) al-
lowing us not only to exactly replicate the running variable used by the firm’s ac-
countant but also to observe whether the worker continued paying the income tax or
61Firms must file a monthly tax return to remit social security contributions through a centralized pro-
cessing software called SICOSS. In this return, they report monthly gross earnings and other related
compensation components. These are the data that we have at hand. For workers affected by the
income tax, firms must also remit income tax withholdings (or refunds) every month through another
centralized processing software called SICORE.
62We are aware that this conclusion is drawn based on two non-random cases. But the fact that these
data come from a medium and a large firm, and that their records and processing perfectly match our
criteria, is indeed reassuring.
63The merge was performed by personnel at the Ministry of Labor to preserve individuals’ confiden-
tiality.
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became tax exempt after August 2013.
One of the firms, hereinafter Firm #1, is medium-sized with approximately 30 work-
ers and belongs to the wholesale food sector. The other firm, hereinafter Firm #2, is
large with approximately 700 workers and belongs to the educational services sector.
Firm #1 provided data for the 12 months of 2013, 8 months of 2014, and 1 month of
2016. Firm #2 provided data for the 12 months of 2013 and 2016. We first present some
graphical evidence for Firm #1 and then proceed to a similar analysis for Firm #2.
In Figure A23, we plot total earnings reported by Firm #1 to the IRS against the
earnings variable that the accountant provided directly to us. Each dot corresponds
to an individual-year-month observation. The graph shows that the information from
both sources is perfectly aligned with a slope equal to 1. Although reassuring, this
is not surprising as earnings and social security contributions reported in payslips is
the information that the firm actually files every month to the IRS through form 931,
which is the source of the administrative data that we use in the main analysis.
The key advantage of gaining access to granular private data is that it contains in-
come tax-related concepts. Figure A24 presents the number of employees at Firm #1
for whom the employer withholds income tax every month. It spans the period be-
fore the reform, some months during the tax holiday, and one month after the reform
was reversed. From these raw data, we can see that the number of workers affected
by the tax decreases when the decree is passed, stabilizes during the tax break, and
jumps up again after the new administration repealed the decree. With these data at
hand, we proceed to compare the true tax status of workers to our measured running
variable. In Figure A25, we report the number of withheld and non-withheld workers
before, during, and after the reform for a balanced sample present in the whole pe-
riod. The three bars to the left correspond to workers below 15k and the three bars to
the right correspond to workers above 15k (always using our running variable). On
the one hand, seven workers below the discontinuity were positively affected by the
reform and four of them were negatively affected when it was repealed. On the other
hand, the ten workers above the discontinuity kept paying the tax normally during
the whole period.64
Figure A27 is even more transparent as it shows the position of every employee
from Firm #1 along the running variable and whether they were affected by the income
tax, both before and after the reform (panels a and b, respectively). By comparing both
panels we can see that all the dots below the discontinuity stopped paying the income
tax and all the dots above the discontinuity kept paying the tax.65
The reader might have concerns that there is not enough mass around the discon-
tinuity to judge the likelihood of mismeasurement in the running variable. This is
why we sought a “bigger fish” and requested data from a larger firm like Firm #2.
Since educational services is a sector where workers typically have more than one
employer (e.g., a part-time teaching position and a full-time position in another insti-
tution), we restrict the analysis to workers with only one job (i.e., permanent workers
64In fact, the tax burden increased for these workers due to a lack of adjustment in nominal exemptions,
inflation, and bracket creep.
65The reason why some dots below the threshold are not affected by the tax before the reform is because
they have a larger family size and thus can subtract more personal exemptions from the tax base.
84
at the firm).66 In addition, we restrict the analysis to workers who had taxes withheld
in at least one month before the reform. With these reasonable conditions, the size of
our sample decreases from 700 to 115 workers. In Figure A28, we report the number of
employees subject to the income tax from January to December 2013 and 2016. About
35 workers stopped paying the income tax after August 2013 and about 20 workers
became again subject to the tax when the reform was reversed.67
In Figure A29, we compare the measured running variable constructed from our
data and the true running variable used by Firm #2. The graph was constructed for the
115 workers who were subject to the income tax during 2013. This graph shows that
almost all the observations fall on the 45-degree line. There are only 2 cases out of 115
(∼ 2%) for which the value of our running variable is lower than the value used by
the firm, but because both values are below 15k, it does not lead to a misclassification
of workers in terms of their tax status.
In Figure A30 we zoom in on our measured running variable at 10k-20k and, using
tax data from the firm, we compare what happened to workers with incomes below
and above 15k before and after the decree was passed (panels a and b, respectively).
Similar to Figure A27, all the workers with incomes below the discontinuity became
tax exempt and all the workers with incomes above the discontinuity continued pay-
ing the tax normally. This figure is more convincing because there is sufficient mass
around the threshold.
Finally, the larger sample size of Firm #2 also allows us to gauge the magnitude of
the first-stage change in tax withholdings. In Figure A31, we plot the average tax rate
(ATR) against our measured running variable right before and right after the reform is
implemented (panel a) and right before and right after the reform is repealed (panel
b). While the ATR goes from about 6% to 0% for workers right below the cutoff, it
increases substantially to about 12% for workers above the cutoff due to the lack of
adjustment in nominal exemptions, inflation, and bracket creep. When the reform
is reversed, the ATR increases (decreases) to the pre-reform level for workers below
(above) the threshold.
Taken together, the evidence presented in this subsection suggests that, in practice,
non-classical measurement error in the running variable appears small. Thus, we be-
lieve that any attenuation bias arising from non-classical measurement error is presum-
ably a second-order issue and does not pose a threat to the main empirical findings of
the paper.
66Recall that in the case of workers with multiple jobs, the employer in charge of withholding the income
tax for the income earned in all the jobs, is the one paying the highest salary. Hence, for the purpose of
the exercise, it is necessary to restrict the analysis to single-job workers (about 40 percent of the firm).
This subgroup mostly comprises faculty and administrative employees (52% and 38%, respectively).
67The drop in March 2013 is explained by a another decree passed by the president that updated the
nominal value of personal exemptions. This was the standard tool used by the government every
other year to avoid massive bracket creep. The time series quickly goes up again due to inflation and
wage negotiations conducted during the March-May period.
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Notes: This simulation provides a visual illustration of how measurement error in the running vari-
able affects the first stage of the RDD. The figure displays three cases: (1) under no measurement error in
the assignment variable (blue line), workers above the threshold continue paying the tax normally and
workers below the threshold become tax exempt. Therefore, there is a sharp jump from 0 to 1 at the
discontinuity; (2) under non-classical measurement error (red line), workers whose highest salary was be-
low the threshold are very likely to become tax exempt, but some workers receiving unusual payments
could be put incorrectly above the threshold, introducing some fuzziness in the design. The first-stage
jump still exists but is attenuated; (3) under classical measurement error (black line), both workers to
the left and to the right of the threshold could be incorrectly misclassified, eliminating the first-stage
effect. The sample is set to 100,000 observations. For classical measurement error, the running vari-
able is X = X∗ + u where X∗ ∼ U[−10, 10] and u ∼ N(0, 3). The true sharp treatment is defined as
T = 1[X∗ > 0]. The treatment for the non-classical case is defined as T = (0.2 + 0.05X∗) if X∗ ≤ 0 and
T = 1 if X∗ > 0 so that the size of the first-stage jump is 0.8.
87






































Notes: This figure plots total earnings reported by Firm #1 to the IRS (vertical axis) against the sum of
earnings from the payslips provided by the firm (horizontal axis). Each dot corresponds to a worker-
year-month observation. The graph shows that the information from the two sources accord perfectly.


























































































Notes: This figure presents the number of employees for whom the employer withholds taxes every
month. It includes the period before the reform, some months during the tax holiday, and one month
after the repeal.
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Withheld
Non-withheld
Notes: This figure reports the number of workers subject to and exempt from tax withholding before,
during, and after the reform for a balanced panel of workers present during the entire period. The 3
bars to the left correspond to workers below 15k and the 3 bars to the right correspond to workers above
15k. In both cases, we use our measured running variable based on IRS data and the tax status reported
by Firm #1. Seven workers below the discontinuity became tax exempt and four of them again became
subject to the tax after the repeal. The ten workers above the discontinuity continued paying the tax
normally during the entire period.
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Non-withheld
Notes: This figure is equivalent to Figure A25, but for Firm #2. 36 workers below the discontinuity
became untaxed in 2013 and 25 of them became again subject to the tax after the repeal in 2016. The 71
workers above the discontinuity continued paying the tax normally during the entire period.
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Figure A27: Workers subject to tax withholding, pre/post reform (Firm #1)
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Notes: This figure shows the position of every individual on the running variable (horizontal axis) and
the probability of paying the income tax (vertical axis) before and after the reform. Panel (a) considers
any month between January and August 2013, and panel (b) considers any month between September
2013 and December 2014. To maximize the mass, the graph was constructed for the unbalanced sample
of workers.
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Notes: This figure presents the number of employees for whom the employer withheld taxes from
January to December 2013 and from January to December 2016. The drop in March 2013 is explained
by another decree passed by the president that updated the nominal value of personal exemptions.


































Notes: This figure compares our measured running variable (vertical axis) and the true running variable
used by Firm #2 (horizontal axis). The sample includes 115 workers who were subject to the income tax
during 2013. The graph shows that almost all the observations fall on the 45-degree line, indicating that
measurement error is almost zero.
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Figure A30: Workers subject to tax withholding, pre/post reform (Firm #2)
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Notes: This figure shows the position of every individual on the running variable (horizontal axis) and
the probability of paying the income tax (vertical axis) before and after the reform. It uses our measured
running variable and the income tax status as reported by the firm. Panel (a) is computed for the months
of July and August 2013, and panel (b) is computed for the months of September and October 2013.
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Figure A31: Evolution of the Average Tax Rate (Firm #2)
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Jan 2016 (pre repeal)
Dec 2016 (post repeal)
Notes: This figure plots the average tax rate (vertical axis) against the running variable (horizontal axis)
before, during, and after the reform. Each dot corresponds to a worker. It uses our measured running
variable and the income tax withholding as reported by the firm. Panel (a) is computed for the months
of July and December 2013, and panel (b) is computed for the months of January and December 2016.
The gray dots correspond to the pre-reform period, the blue dots show data during the reform, and the
red dots correspond to the post-repeal period.
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C A graphic representation in the static model
The static model of labor supply can be viewed as a special case of a dynamic model where
all intertemporal linkages exist, but workers are myopic and ignore them when deciding how
much labor to supply. We present a simple graphical framework to explain the predicted
effects of the reform on the labor supply of workers. Monthly wage earnings z are defined as
posted earnings before an employee’s payroll and income taxes. Net earnings c are defined as
earnings after taxes (i.e., take-home pay). Earnings include several components such as base
pay, overtime pay, seniority, bonuses, vacation pay, 13th-month salary, etc.
In Figure A32, we depict the effect of the reform on the individual budget set and utility
maximizing choices in the consumption-earnings space for a frictionless labor market. Utility
increases with disposable income c (as disposable income funds consumption) and decreases
with z (as labor supply is costly). To simplify the analysis, we focus on a single worker with no
children.68 Before the reform, a worker with these characteristics and gross monthly earnings
greater than AR$ 8,360 was subject to the income tax.69 This first kink is shown in the figure at
8.3k. Without loss of generality, we also assume that the first tax bracket goes beyond the 15k
cutoff.
Figure A32 panel (a) shows the predicted effects of the reform for individuals whose high-
est gross monthly salary accrued between January and August 2013 was less than AR$15,000
(group 1). These wage earners were fully exempt from the income tax from September 2013
onwards, regardless of subsequent earnings. Along the intensive margin, workers below 8.3k
had not been paying income taxes before the reform and thus were unaffected. Workers with
pre-reform earnings between 8.3k and 15k experience a decrease in marginal income tax rates
from τ > 0 to τ = 0, so that their net-of-income tax rate increases from 1− τ to 1. Their bud-
get set shifts upwards from the black solid line to the blue solid line. This shift creates both a
substitution and an income effect.
The substitution effect motivates individuals to work more hours, increasing wage earn-
ings. Intuitively, individuals have an incentive to work more hours, accept promotions, or
switch to higher-paying jobs, because they can keep the full pay (net of payroll taxes). How-
ever, holding everything else constant, workers maximizing utility in z ∈ (8.3k, 15k] will get
a higher take-home pay now and, therefore, the income effect will push them to work fewer
hours, reducing wage earnings. In this case, a worker maximizing utility at point 1 could end
up at points such as 2, 3, or 4. Thus, the effect of the tax break on earnings for this group of
workers is ambiguous. Finally, note that workers bunching at the first kink (8.3k; i.e. maxi-
mizing at point 5) experience a substitution effect that will push them to work more hours (or
report higher earnings). This implies that, after the reform, we should expect bunching at the
first kink (if any) to decrease substantially.
Figure A32 panel (b) shows the predicted effects of the reform for individuals whose highest
gross monthly wage accrued between January and August 2013 was between AR$15,001 and
AR$25,000 (group 2). In this case, the reform increased the minimum non taxable income
20 percent from 8.3k to 10k, hence shifting outward the first kink point in the budget set.70
Workers with pre-reform earnings between 15k and 25k experience no changes in marginal
income tax rates and, therefore, the substitution effect is zero. However, holding everything
68In section 4.2 we show that this is the group that faced the largest incentive to adjust their labor supply
when the reform was implemented.
69The minimum non-taxable income for a married worker with two children was AR$ 11,563 immedi-
ately before the reform.
70The 20% increase in personal exemptions corresponds to deductions for a spouse and children, non-
taxable income, and a special deduction for wage earners.
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else constant, workers maximizing utility in z ∈ (15k, 25k] will get a higher take-home pay
while the tax exemption is in force. Thus, the income effect predicts a reduction in hours of
work and hence gross earnings. For example, a worker maximizing utility at point 1 would
go to a point like 2. Finally, note that the first kink moved from 8.3k to 10k (point 3 to 4).
However, this change should not matter for the analysis as, by definition, these workers were
already making more than 15k before the reform.
Finally, workers whose highest gross monthly wage accrued between January and August
2013 was greater than AR$25,000 continued paying taxes based on the black solid line (group
3). In practice, however, group 2 and 3 experienced an increase in marginal and average tax
rates due to inflation and bracket creep. In this case, the substitution effect will reduce hours
of work and, hence, in gross earnings. But the income effect will make them work more hours.
In the case of group 3, most of these workers were already facing the top 35% marginal tax rate
and, thus, experience a pure income effect.
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Figure A32: Conceptual framework for single workers without children
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(a) Case 1: max{earnings|Jan to Aug 2013} ≤ 15k
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(b) Case 2: 15k < max{earnings|Jan to Aug 2013} ≤ 25k
Notes: The figure displays the effects of the 2013 income tax change on the monthly budget constraint of single workers with no children. This static framework
can be viewed as a special case of the dynamic model, where all intertemporal linkages exist, but workers are myopic and ignore them when deciding how
much labor to supply. The x-axis represents gross monthly wages (including the employee’s payroll taxes). The y-axis represents net monthly wages (wages
net of both payroll and income taxes). The black solid line is the old regime budget and the blue solid line is the new regime budget. Panel (a) shows the effect
of the reform for workers who were fully exempt. Panel (b) shows the effect of the reform for workers who received a 20% increase in personal exemptions.
The first kink denoted by 8.3k corresponds to AR$ 8,360 as of August 2013. The kink denoted by 10k corresponds to AR$ 10,032 starting in September 2013 for
workers who continued paying the income tax.
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